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PRICES, MARKUPS, AND TRADE REFORM
BY JAN DE LOECKER, PINELOPI K. GOLDBERG,
AMIT K. KHANDELWAL, AND NINA PAVCNIK1
This paper examines how prices, markups, and marginal costs respond to trade liberalization. We develop a framework to estimate markups from production data with
multi-product firms. This approach does not require assumptions on the market structure or demand curves faced by firms, nor assumptions on how firms allocate their inputs across products. We exploit quantity and price information to disentangle markups
from quantity-based productivity, and then compute marginal costs by dividing observed prices by the estimated markups. We use India’s trade liberalization episode
to examine how firms adjust these performance measures. Not surprisingly, we find
that trade liberalization lowers factory-gate prices and that output tariff declines have
the expected pro-competitive effects. However, the price declines are small relative
to the declines in marginal costs, which fall predominantly because of the input tariff
liberalization. The reason for this incomplete cost pass-through to prices is that firms
offset their reductions in marginal costs by raising markups. Our results demonstrate
substantial heterogeneity and variability in markups across firms and time and suggest
that producers benefited relative to consumers, at least immediately after the reforms.
KEYWORDS: Variable markups, production function estimation, pass-through, input
tariffs, trade liberalization.

1. INTRODUCTION
TRADE REFORMS HAVE THE POTENTIAL to deliver substantial benefits to
economies by forcing a more efficient allocation of resources. A large body
of theoretical and empirical literature has analyzed the mechanisms behind
this process. When trade barriers fall, aggregate productivity rises as less productive firms exit and the remaining firms expand (e.g., Melitz (2003), Pavcnik
(2002)) and take advantage of cheaper or previously unavailable imported inputs (e.g., Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2010a), Amiti and
Konings (2007), Halpern, Koren, and Szeidl (2011)). Trade reforms have also
been shown to reduce markups (e.g., Levinsohn (1993), Harrison (1994)).
Based on this evidence, we should expect trade reforms to exert downward
pressure on firm prices. However, we have little direct evidence on how prices
respond to liberalization because they are rarely observed during trade reforms. We fill this gap by examining how prices, and their underlying markup
1
The main work for this project was carried out while Goldberg was a Fellow of the Guggenheim Foundation, De Loecker was a visitor of the Cowles Foundation at Yale University and
a visiting Professor at Stanford University, and Khandelwal was a Kenen Fellow at the International Economics Section at Princeton University. The authors thank the respective institutions for their support. We are grateful to Steve Berry, Elhanan Helpman, Ariel Pakes, Andres
Rodriguez-Clare, and Frank Wolak for useful discussions at early stages of this project and seminar participants at several institutions and conferences. We also thank the editor and three anonymous referees for insightful comments and suggestions.
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and cost components, adjust during India’s comprehensive trade liberalization.
To obtain the markup and cost components, we develop a unified framework
to estimate jointly markups and marginal costs from production data.
Our paper makes three main contributions. First, we develop a unified
framework to estimate markups and marginal costs of multi-product firms
across a broad set of manufacturing industries. Since these measures are unobserved, we must impose some structure on the data. However, our approach
does not require parametric assumptions on consumer demand, market structure, or the nature of competition common in industrial organization studies. This flexibility is particularly appealing in settings when one wants to infer
the full distribution of markups across firms and products over time in different manufacturing sectors. Since prices are observed, we can directly recover marginal costs from the markup estimates. Data containing this level
of detail are becoming increasingly available, so this methodology is useful to
researchers studying other countries and industries. The drawback of this approach is that we are unable to perform counterfactual simulations since we do
not explicitly model consumer demand and firm pricing behavior.
The second and key contribution of our study is towards the methodology
to estimate production functions. In order to infer markups, the proposed approach requires estimates of production functions. Typically, these estimates
have well-known biases if researchers use revenue rather than quantity data.
Estimates of “true” productivity (or marginal costs) are confounded by demand shocks and markups, and these biases may be severe (see Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008), De Loecker (2011)). We address the output
price-bias by estimating a quantity-based production function using data that
contain the prices and quantities of firms’ products over time. The focus on
a quantity-based production function highlights the need for the estimation to
address two additional biases that have not received much attention in the literature: the bias stemming from the unobserved allocation of inputs across products within multi-product firms and the bias stemming from unobserved input
prices (due to the use of quality-differentiated inputs) by firms—the so-called
input price bias. Our study contributes an approach to address these biases.
This is important as future waves of plant- and firm-level data may start providing information on physical quantities of output, forcing researchers to confront the challenges associated with multi-product production function estimation. Moreover, researchers may want to start combining data from firm-level
production surveys with fine-grained product-level information from consumer
scanner data, which will also require an explicit treatment of multi-product
firms in the production function estimation.
Third, existing studies that have analyzed the impact of trade reforms on
markups have focused exclusively on the competitive effects from declines in
output tariffs (e.g., Levinsohn (1993), Harrison (1994)). Comprehensive reforms also lower tariffs on imported inputs and previous work, particularly
on India, has emphasized this aspect of trade reforms (e.g., Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2009)). These two tariff reductions represent
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distinct shocks to domestic firms. Lower output tariffs increase competition
by changing the residual demand that firms face. Conversely, firms benefit
from lower costs of production when input tariffs decline. It is important to
account for both channels of liberalization to understand the overall impact of
trade reforms on prices and markups. In particular, changes in markups depend on the extent to which firms pass these cost savings to consumers, the
pass-through being influenced by both the market structure and nature of demand. For example, in models with monopolistic competition and CES demand, markups are constant and so, by assumption, pass-through of tariffs on
prices is complete. Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare (2012) demonstrated that several of the influential trade models assume constant markups
and by doing so, abstract away from the markup channel as a potential source
of gains from trade. This is the case in Ricardian models that assume perfect
competition, such as Eaton and Kortum (2002), and models with monopolistic
competition, such as Krugman (1980) and its heterogeneous firm extensions
like Melitz (2003). There are models that can account for variable markups by
imposing some structure on demand and market structure.2 While these studies allow for richer patterns of markup adjustment, the empirical results on
markups and pass-through ultimately depend on the underlying parametric assumptions imposed on consumer demand and nature of competition. Ideally,
we want to understand how trade reforms affect markups without having to
rely on explicit parametric assumptions of the demand systems and/or market
structures, which themselves may change with trade liberalization.
The structure of our analysis is as follows. We use production data to infer
markups by exploiting the optimality of firms’ variable input choices. Our approach is based on Hall (1988) and De Loecker and Warzynski (2012), but we
extend their methodology to account for multi-product firms and to take advantage of observable price data and physical quantity of products. In order to
infer markups, we assume that firms minimize cost; then, markups are the deviation between the elasticity of output with respect to a variable input and that
input’s share of total revenue. We obtain this output elasticity from estimates
of production functions across many industries. The use of physical quantity
data alleviates the concern that the production function estimation is contaminated by prices, yet presents different challenges that we discuss in detail in
Section 3. Most importantly, using physical quantity data forces us to conduct
the analysis at the product level since without a demand system to aggregate
across products, prices and physical quantities are only defined at the product
level.
2

See Goldberg (1995), Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003), Goldberg and Verboven
(2005), Atkeson and Burstein (2008), Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), Feenstra and Weinstein
(2010), Nakamura and Zerom (2010), Edmonds, Midrigan, and Xu (2011), Goldberg and Hellerstein (2013), Arkolakis, Costinot, Donaldson, and Rodríguez-Clare (2012), Mayer, Melitz, and
Ottaviano (2014), and Atkin and Donaldson (2014).
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The approach we propose calls for an explicit treatment of multi-product
firms. We show how to exploit data on single-product firms along with a sample
selection correction to obtain consistent estimates of the production functions.
The benefit of using single-product firms at the production function estimation stage is that it does not require assumptions on how firms allocate inputs
across products, something we do not observe in our data.3 This approach assumes that the physical relationship between inputs and outputs is the same
for single- and multi-product firms that manufacture the same product. That
is, a single-product firm uses the same technology to produce rickshaws as a
multi-product firm that produces rickshaws and cars. While this assumption
may appear strong, it is already implicitly employed in all previous work that
pools data across single- and multi-product firms (e.g., Olley and Pakes (1996)
or Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)). Once we estimate the production functions
from the single-product firms, we show how to back out allocation of inputs
across products within a multi-product firm. We obtain the markups for each
product manufactured by firms by dividing the output elasticity of materials by
the materials share of total revenue.4 Finally, we divide prices by the markups
to obtain marginal costs.
The estimation of the production function provides plausible results and
highlights the importance of addressing the input price bias. We also observe
that firms have lower markups and higher marginal costs on products that
are farther from their core competency, a finding consistent with recent heterogeneous models of multi-product firms. Foreshadowing the impact of the
trade liberalizations, we find that changes in marginal costs are not perfectly
reflected in changes in prices because of variable markups (i.e., incomplete
pass-through).
Our main results focus on how prices, marginal costs, and markups adjust
during India’s trade liberalization. As has been discussed extensively in earlier work, the nature of India’s reform provides an identification strategy that
alleviates the standard endogeneity concerns associated with trade liberalization. Perhaps not surprisingly, we observe price declines during the reform
period, but these declines appear modest relative to the size of the reform.
On average, prices fall 18 percent despite average output tariff declines of 62
percentage points. Marginal costs, however, decline on average by 31 percent
3
Suppose a firm manufactures three products using raw materials, labor, and capital. To our
knowledge, no data set covering manufacturing firms reports information on how much of each
input is used for each product. One way around this problem is to assume input proportionality. For example, Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008) allocated inputs based on products’
revenue shares. Their approach is valid under perfect competition or the assumption of constant
markups across all products produced by a firm. While these assumptions may be appropriate for
the particular homogeneous good industries they studied, we study a broad class of differentiated
products where these assumptions may not apply. Moreover, our study aims to estimate markups
without imposing such implicit assumptions.
4
For multi-product firms, we use the estimated input allocations in the markup calculation.
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due primarily to input tariff liberalization; this finding is consistent with earlier work demonstrating the importance of imported inputs in India’s trade
reform. The predominant force driving down marginal costs is lower input tariffs reducing the costs of imported inputs, rather than output tariffs reducing
X-inefficiencies. The importance of input tariffs is consistent with earlier results by Amiti and Konings (2007) on Indonesia and Topalova and Khandelwal
(2011) on India who found that firm-level productivity changes were predominantly driven by input tariff declines. Since our prices decompose exactly into
their underlying cost and markup components, we can show that the reason
the relatively large decline in marginal costs did not translate to equally large
price declines was because markups increased: on average, the trade reform
raised relative markups by 13 percent. The increases in markups are due to
the fact that prices do not respond fully to cost, a finding that has been studied extensively in the exchange rate literature and is consistent with any model
with variable markups. Finally, we observe that firms’ ability to raise markups
even further is mitigated by the pro-competitive impact of output tariff declines, particularly for those firms with very high initial markups. Our analysis
is based on data representative of larger firms, so our results are representative
of these larger firms.
Our results suggest that the most likely beneficiaries of the trade liberalization in the short run are domestic Indian firms who benefit from lower production costs while simultaneously raising markups. The short-run gains to consumers appear small, especially considering that we observe factory-gate prices
rather than retail prices. However, the additional short-run profits accrued to
firms may have spurred innovation in Indian manufacturing, particularly in the
introduction of many new products, that benefit consumers in the long run.
These new products accounted for about a quarter of overall manufacturing
growth (see Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2010b)). In earlier work, we showed that the new product introductions were concentrated
in sectors with disproportionally large input tariff declines that allowed firms
access to new, previously unavailable imported materials (see Goldberg et al.
(2010a)). In the present paper, we find that firms with larger increases in average markups were more likely to introduce new products, which suggests that
higher profits may have financed the development of new products that contributed to long-run gains to consumers. In addition, our empirical findings are
consistent with an increase in the quality of existing products, which would have
further benefited consumers. A more detailed investigation of these channels
is beyond the scope of the present paper.
In addition to the papers discussed earlier, our work is related to a wave of
recent papers that focus on productivity in developing countries, such as Bloom
and Van Reenen (2007) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009). The low productivity in
the developing world is often attributed to lack of competition (see Bloom and
Van Reenen (2007, 2010)) or the presence of policy distortions that result in
a misallocation of resources across firms (Hsieh and Klenow (2009)). Against
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this background, it is natural to ask whether there is any evidence that an increase in competition or a removal of distortions reduces production costs.
India’s reforms are an excellent context to study these questions because of
the nature of the reforms and the availability of detailed data. Trade protection is a policy distortion that distorts resource allocation. Limited competition benefits some firms relative to others, and the high input tariffs are akin
to the capital distortions examined by Hsieh and Klenow (2009). Our results
suggest that the removal of barriers on inputs lowered production costs, so the
reforms did indeed deliver gains in the form of lower production costs. However, the overall picture is more nuanced as firms do not appear to pass the
entirety of the cost savings to consumers in the form of lower prices. Our findings highlight the importance of jointly studying changes in prices, markups,
and costs to understand the full distributional consequences of trade liberalization.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we
provide a brief overview of India’s trade reform and the data used in the analysis. In Section 3, we lay out the general empirical framework that allows us
to estimate markups and marginal costs. Section 3.1 presents the theoretical
framework, Section 3.2 presents the empirical methodology to estimate the
production function and discusses identification, and Section 3.3 explains the
process to recover the allocation of inputs across products for multi-product
firms. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes.
2. DATA AND TRADE POLICY BACKGROUND
We first describe the Indian data since they dictate our empirical methodology. We also describe key elements of India’s trade liberalization that are
important for our identification strategy. Given that the Indian trade liberalization has been described in a number of papers (including several by a subset
of the present authors), we keep the discussion of the reforms brief.
2.1. Production and Price Data
We use the Prowess data that are collected by the Centre for Monitoring
the Indian Economy (CMIE). Prowess includes the usual set of variables typically found in firm-level production data, but has important advantages over
the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI), India’s manufacturing census over the
1989–2003 period that spans India’s trade liberalization. First, unlike the repeated cross section in the older versions of the Annual Survey of Industries
(ASI), Prowess is a panel that tracks firm performance over time. Second, the
data span India’s 1991 trade liberalization. Third, Prowess records detailed
product-level information for each firm. This enables us to distinguish between
single-product and multi-product firms, and track changes in firm scope over
the sample period. Fourth, Prowess collects information on quantity and sales
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for each reported product, so we can construct the prices of each product a
firm manufactures. These advantages make Prowess particularly well suited for
understanding the mechanisms of firm-level adjustments in response to trade
liberalizations that are typically hidden in other data sources, and deal with
measurement issues that arise in most studies that estimate production functions.5
Prowess enables us to track firms’ product mix over time because Indian
firms are required by the 1956 Companies Act to disclose product-level information on capacities, production, and sales in their annual reports. As discussed extensively in Goldberg et al. (2010b), several features of the database
give us confidence in its quality. Product-level information is available for 85
percent of the manufacturing firms, which collectively account for more than
90 percent of Prowess’s manufacturing output and exports. Since product-level
information and overall output are reported in separate modules, we can cross
check the consistency of the data. Product-level sales comprise 99 percent of
the (independently) reported manufacturing sales. We refer the reader to Appendix C and Goldberg et al. (2010a, 2010b) for a more detailed discussion of
the data.
The definition of a product is based on the CMIE’s internal product classification, which is based on India’s national industrial classification (NIC). There
are 1400 products in the sample for estimation.6 Table I reports basic summary
statistics by two-digit NIC (India’s industrial classification system) sector. As a
comparison, the U.S. data used by Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2010) contain approximately 1500 products, defined as five-digit SIC codes across 455
four-digit SIC industries. Thus, our definition of a product is similar to earlier
work that has focused on the United States. Table II provides a few examples
of products available in our data set. In our terminology, we will distinguish between “sectors” (which correspond to two-digit NIC aggregates), “industries”
(which correspond to four-digit NIC aggregates), and “products” (the finest
disaggregation we observe); we emphasize that since the “product” definition
is available at a highly disaggregated level, unit values are plausibly interpreted
as “prices” in our application.
The data also have some disadvantages. Unlike Census data, the CMIE
database is not well suited for understanding firm entry and exit. However,
Prowess contains mainly medium large Indian firms, so entry and exit is not
5

The ASI has recently released panel data that contain similar product-level information.
These data have the advantage of being a representative survey of Indian manufacturing activity
and contain both the wage bill and number of employees, but because these recent waves do not
span the Indian trade liberalization period, we are unable to use them for our analysis.
6
We have fewer products than in Goldberg et al. (2010b) because we require nonmissing values
for quantities and revenues rather than just a count of products, and drop small sectors that do
not have enough observations to implement the methodology.
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TABLE I
SUMMARY STATISTICSa
Share of Sample
Output
(1)

Sector

15 Food products and beverages
17 Textiles, apparel
21 Paper and paper products
24 Chemicals
25 Rubber and plastic
26 Nonmetallic mineral products
27 Basic metals
28 Fabricated metal products
29 Machinery and equipment
31 Electrical machinery and communications
34 Motor vehicles, trailers
Total

Single-Product
All Firms
(2)

Firms
(3)

Products
(4)

9%
10%
3%
26%
5%
7%
16%
2%
7%
5%
9%

302
303
77
434
139
110
212
74
160
89
71

135
161
56
194
85
74
115
48
80
52
47

135
78
32
483
83
60
101
45
186
102
95

100%

1970

1047

1400

a Table reports summary statistics for the average year in the sample. Column 1 reports the share of output by sector
in the average year. Columns 2 and 3 report the number of firms and number of single-product firms manufacturing
products in the average year. Column 4 reports the number of products by sector.

necessarily an important margin for understanding the process of adjustment
to increased openness within this subset of the manufacturing sector.7
We complement the production data with tariff rates from 1987 to 2001.
The tariff data are reported at the six-digit Harmonized System (HS) level
and were compiled by Topalova (2010). We pass the tariff data through India’s
input-output matrix for 1993–1994 to construct input tariffs. We concord the
tariffs to India’s national industrial classification (NIC) schedule developed by
input
Debroy and Santhanam (1993). Formally, input tariffs are defined as τit =

output
output
, where τkt
is the tariff on industry k at time t, and aki is the
k aki τkt
share of industry k in the value of industry i.
2.2. India’s Trade Liberalization
A key advantage of our approach is that we examine the impact of openness by relying on changes in trade costs induced by a large-scale trade liberalization. India’s post-independence development strategy was one of national
self-sufficiency and heavy government regulation of the economy. India’s trade
regime was amongst the most restrictive in Asia, with high nominal tariffs and
nontariff barriers. In response to a balance-of-payments crisis, India launched
7
Firms in Prowess account for 60 to 70 percent of the economic activity in the organized industrial sector and comprise 75 percent of corporate taxes and 95 percent of excise duty collected by
the Government of India (CMIE).
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TABLE II
EXAMPLE OF SECTOR, INDUSTRY, AND PRODUCT CLASSIFICATIONSa
NIC Code

Description

27

Basic metal industries (sector s)

2710

Manufacture of basic iron and steel (industry i)
130101010000
130101020000
130101030000
130106040800
130106040900
130106050000
130106100000
130106100300

Products (j)
Pig iron
Sponge iron
Ferro alloys
Welded steel tubular poles
Steel tubular structural poles
Tube and pipe fittings
Wires and ropes of iron and steel
Stranded wire
Casting of iron and steel (industry i)

2731
130106030000
130106030100
130106030101
130106030102
130106030103
130106030104
130106030199

Products (j)
Castings and forgings
Castings
Steel castings
Cast iron castings
Maleable iron castings
S.G. iron castings
Castings, nec

a This table is replicated from Goldberg et al. (2010b). For NIC 2710, there are a total of 111 products, but only a
subset are listed in the table. For NIC 2731, all products are listed in the table.

a dramatic liberalization of the economy as part of an IMF structural adjustment program in August 1991. An important part of this reform was to abandon the extremely restrictive trade policies it had pursued since independence.
Several features of the trade reform are crucial to our study. First, the external crisis of 1991, which came as a surprise, opened the way for market
oriented reforms (Hasan, Mitra, and Ramaswamy (2007)).8 The liberalization
of the trade policy was therefore unanticipated by firms in India and not foreseen in their decisions prior to the reform. Moreover, reforms were passed
quickly as sort of a “shock therapy” with little debate or analysis to avoid the
inevitable political opposition (see Goyal (1996)). Industries with the highest
tariffs received the largest tariff cuts, implying that both the average and standard deviation of tariffs across industries fell. While there was significant vari8

Some commentators (e.g., Panagariya (2008)) noted that once the balance of payments crisis
ensued, market-based reforms were inevitable. While the general direction of the reforms may
have been anticipated, the precise changes in tariffs were not. Our empirical strategy accounts
for this shift in broad anticipation of the reforms, but exploits variation in the sizes of the tariff
cuts across industries.
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ation in the tariff changes across industries, Topalova and Khandelwal (2011)
showed that tariff changes through 1997 were uncorrelated with pre-reform
firm and industry characteristics such as productivity, size, output growth during the 1980s, and capital intensity. The tariff liberalization does not appear
to have been targeted towards specific industries and appears relatively free
of usual political economy pressures until 1997 (which coincides with an election that changed political power). We estimate the production function and
markups on the full sample, but restrict our analysis of the trade reform to the
1989–1997 period when trade policy did not respond to pre-existing industryor firm-level trends. We again refer the reader to previous publications that
have used this trade reform for a detailed discussion (Topalova and Khandelwal (2011), Topalova (2010), Sivadasan (2009), Goldberg et al. (2010a, 2010b)).
3. METHODOLOGY: RECOVERING MARKUPS AND MARGINAL COSTS
This section describes the framework to estimate markups and marginal
costs using product- and firm-level production data. Section 3.1 presents the
theoretical framework and explicitly states the assumptions required to implement the approach. The computation of markups and marginal costs requires
estimates of production function coefficients and information about the allocation of inputs across products. Section 3.2 describes the methodology to estimate the production function and identification. Once the production function
parameters are estimated, Section 3.3 explains how we recover the allocation
of inputs across products for multi-product firms. In Section 3.4, we discuss
how we compute markups and marginal costs. Section 3.5 comments on the
assumptions required to implement our methodology.
3.1. Theoretical Framework
Consider a production function for a firm f producing a product j at time t:
(1)

Qfjt = Fjt (Vfjt  Kfjt )Ωf t 

where Q is physical output, V is a vector of variable inputs that the firm can
freely adjust, and K is a vector of fixed inputs that face adjustment costs. The
firm’s productivity is denoted Ωf t . A firm produces a discrete number of products Jf t . Collect the inputs into a vector X = {V K}. Let Wfjtv denote the price
of a variable input v and Wfjtk denote the price of a dynamic input k, with
v = {1     V } and k = {1     K}.
We begin by characterizing conceptual assumptions necessary to estimate
markups and marginal costs for multi-product firms. We refer to these assumptions as conceptual because they are independent of the particular data and
setting. Implementing the approach requires additional assumptions dictated
by particular features of our data and our focus on India’s trade reforms (e.g.,
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functional form and identification assumptions), and we describe these in the
next section. The approach requires the following assumptions:
ASSUMPTION 1: The production technology is product-specific.
Our notation reflects this assumption. The production function F(·) is indexed by product j. This assumption implies that a single-product firm and a
multi-product firm that produce the same product have the same production
technology, although their productivities Ωf t might differ.
ASSUMPTION 2: Fjt (·) is continuous and twice differentiable w.r.t. at least one
element of Vfjt , and this element of Vfjt is a static (i.e., freely adjustable or variable)
input in the production of product j.
This assumption restricts the technology so that the firm can adjust its output
quantity by changing a particular variable input.9 Furthermore, this assumption
implies that firm cost minimization involves at least one static first-order condition with respect to a variable input of production.
ASSUMPTION 3: Hicks-neutral productivity Ωf t is log-additive and firmspecific.
This assumption implies that a multi-product firm has the same productivity
Ωf t in the production of all its products.10 This assumption follows the tradition of modeling productivity in the multi-product firm literature in this manner (e.g., Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2011)). For single-product firms, this
assumption is of course redundant.
ASSUMPTION 4: Expenditures on all variable and fixed inputs are attributable
to products.
This assumption implies that we can always
 write the expenditure on input X
attributable to product j as WfjtX Xfjt = ρ̃fjt j (WfjtX Xfjt ), where WfjtX is the price
for input X with X ∈ X, and ρ̃fjt is theshare of input expenditures attributable
to product j with the restriction that j ρ̃fjt = 1. Note that ρ̃fjt is not observed
in the data. Assumption 4 allows for economies (or diseconomies) of scope in
costs of production; we discuss this issue below in Section 3.5.
9
Assumption 2 rules out a fixed proportion technology (e.g., Leontief) in all variable inputs.
The assumption seems reasonable at the level of aggregation of our data. We observe total labor, capital, and intermediate inputs at the firm level, and so there is ample room for firms to
substitute, say, workers for capital while keeping output constant.
10
In principle, we can allow for Fjt (Vfjt  Kfjt  Ωfjt ) to derive a theoretical expression for
markups. However, Assumption 3 is required to estimate markups for multi-product firms.
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ASSUMPTION 5: The state variables of the firm are
sf t = {Jf t  Kfj=1t      KfJf t t  Ωf t  Gf  rfjt }
The state variables include the number of products produced (Jf t ), the dynamic inputs for all products (Kfjt ), productivity (Ωf t ), exogenous factors (e.g.,
location of the firm) (Gf ),11 and all payoff relevant serially correlated variables,
such as tariffs and the firm’s export status (EXPf t ), which we collect in rfjt .
ASSUMPTION 6: Firms minimize short-run costs taking output quantity and input prices Wfjt at time t as given.
Firms face a vector of variable input prices Wfjtv = Wt v (νfjt  Gf  afjt−1 ),
which depends on the quality νfjt of product j, exogenous factors Gf , and
firm/product-level actions afjt−1 taken prior to time t. The latter can capture
pre-negotiated input prices through contracts, for example, as long as the contracts do not specify input prices as a function of current input purchase quantities (i.e., quantity discounts). The important assumption is that a firm’s variable input price does not depend on input quantity. This assumption rules out
static sources of market power in input markets. We discuss this assumption in
more detail at the end of this subsection.
We consider the firm’s cost-minimization problem conditioning on state variables. From Assumptions 2 and 6, firms minimize costs with respect to variable
inputs. Assumptions 4 and 6 imply that costs are separable across products
since a firm’s product mix is a dynamic choice and predetermined at time t
when variable inputs are chosen. Hence, we can minimize costs product-byproduct for multi-product firms.
The associated Lagrangian function for any product j at time t is
(2)

L(Vfjt  Kfjt  λfjt ) =

V

v=1

v
fjt

W V

v
fjt

+



K


k
Wfjtk Kfjt

k=1


+ λfjt Qfjt − Qfjt (Vfjt  Kfjt  Ωf t ) 

The first-order condition for any variable input V v used on product j is
(3)

∂Qfjt (·)
∂Lfjt
v
= 0
v = Wfjt − λfjt
∂Vfjt
∂Vfjtv

11
In our data, we only observe the location of the firms’ headquarters, and not the site of
production, so in practice we exclude this from the analysis. But the general framework can nevertheless account for differences in locations of firms (which may affect, for instance, exogenous
spatial differences in factor prices).
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where the marginal cost of production at a given level of output is λfjt since
∂Lfjt
∂Qfjt

= λfjt . Rearranging terms and multiplying both sides by

Vfjt
Qfjt

provides the

following expression:
(4)

v
v
v
∂Qfjt (·) Vfjt
1 Wfjt Vfjt
=

∂Vfjtv Qfjt
λfjt Qfjt

The left-hand side of the above equation represents the elasticity of output
with respect to variable input Vfjtv (the “output elasticity”): θ =
fine the markup μfjt as μfjt ≡

Pfjt
λfjt

v
∂Qfjt (·) Vfjt
v
∂Vfjt

Qfjt

. De-

.

The cost-minimization condition can be rearranged to express the markup
for each product j as


 v −1
Pfjt Qfjt
v
v
= θfjt
(5)
μfjt = θfjt
αfjt 
v
v
Wfjt Vfjt
where αvfjt is the share of expenditure on input V v allocated to product j in the
total sales of product j. This expression forms the basis for our approach to
compute markups. To compute the markup, we need the output elasticity on
V v for product j, and the share of the input’s expenditure allocated to product
j in the total sales of product j, αvfjt .
The expression for the markup in (5) looks similar to the one derived in De
Loecker and Warzynski (2012) with one crucial difference: all variables are indexed by j. This seemingly small distinction has significant ramifications for
the analysis and precludes us from using the existing approach in De Loecker
and Warzynski (2012) to obtain the subcomponents of (5). De Loecker and
Warzynski (2012) focused on firm-level markups and implemented the conventional production function methodology using revenue data. Because of
their focus and data, they did not need to confront the challenges posed by
multi-product firms. Specifically, the firm-specific expenditure shares are directly observed in their data and the output elasticity is obtained by estimating a firm-level production function using deflated revenues. In contrast, our
framework utilizes product-specific information on quantities and prices. This
forces us to conduct the analysis at the product level because aggregation to
the firm level is not possible without an explicit model of market demand.
The focus on products rather than firms calls for an explicit treatment of
multi-product firms. In a multi-product setting, both components in equation
(5) are unobserved. In contrast to a single-product firm setting, we must estimate the output elasticity separately for each product manufactured by each
firm. Furthermore, the product-specific input expenditure shares αvfjt cannot
be calculated from the data because firms do not report the input expenditure
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allocations ρ̃fjt .12 Our framework, presented below, confronts these two challenges by proposing a methodology for estimating production functions that
explicitly deals with multi-product firms and allows one to impute the input
expenditure allocations across the products of a multi-product firm.
An additional advantage of focusing on products rather than firms is that
once we derive estimates of product-level markups, we can calculate marginal
costs using information on product-level prices, which are observed directly in
the data:
(6)

mcfjt =

Pfjt

μfjt

A brief discussion of the assumptions underlying the analysis is in order.
Assumptions 1–5 have been explicitly or implicitly assumed throughout the literature estimating production functions.13 For example, Assumption 1 is made
implicitly whenever researchers pool single- and multi-product firm data to
estimate production functions, which is almost always the case. The only difference is that the standard approach uses firm-level deflated sales and expenditure data; this practice does not force the researcher to confront multiproduct firms in the data since the analysis is conducted at the firm level. Our
framework strictly nests this approach, but since we use price data, and because
prices are only defined at the product level (unless one is willing to make additional assumptions on demand that will allow aggregation to the firm level), we
must specify physical production functions at the product level. We therefore
explicitly state the assumptions that underlie the treatment of multi-product
firms (Assumptions 1, 3, and 4).
Variants of Assumption 4 have been invoked in the few studies that have
addressed the price bias in production function estimation (e.g., Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008), De Loecker (2011)). Foster, Haltiwanger, and
Syverson (2008) allocated input expenditures according to revenue shares,
while De Loecker (2011) allocated them based on the number of products.
These variants are considerably stronger than, and are strictly nested within,
Assumption 4. Relaxing these input allocation assumptions is one of the
methodological contributions of this paper.
The product-by-product short-run cost minimization with respect to variable
inputs in (2) follows from Assumptions 2, 4, and 6. Assumption 2 assures the
existence of a variable input and is essential for our approach. If all inputs are
dynamic, we can still estimate the production function, but we cannot derive
markups using the approach we described above. However, the assumption
that there is at least one factor of production that the firm can freely adjust
over the period of a year (we have annual production data) is both plausible
and standard in empirical work.
12
13

We are unaware of any data set that provides this information for all inputs.
See Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2015) for an overview of this literature.
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Our framework allows for economies (or diseconomies) of scope. While
physical synergies in production are ruled out by Assumption 1, other forms
of economies (or diseconomies) of scope are consistent with Assumptions 1
and 4. Economies of scope can operate through the Hicks-neutral productivity
shocks Ωf t , through pre-negotiated firm-level contracts for input prices Wvfjt
(as long as these input prices do not depend on quantity of inputs), and also
through the spreading of fixed costs (unrelated to physical synergies in production) across multiple products in multi-product firms.14
Finally, an important assumption we maintain throughout the analysis is that
input prices do not depend on input quantities (Assumption 6). While restrictive, this assumption is more general than the one employed in almost all production function studies, in which it is assumed that all firms face the same input prices (in contrast, we allow for input prices to differ across firms because
of locational differences and/or quality differentiation). If firms have monopsony power in input markets, Assumption 6 will be violated. In this case, one
can show that our approach will tend to understate the level of markups. However, the approach can still be used to trace and explain changes in markups, as
long as there are no contemporaneous changes in firms’ monopsony power, or,
even if there are such changes, as long as changes in firms’ monopsony power
are uncorrelated with trade policy changes. Appendix D provides a detailed
discussion of the conditions under which our approach is valid in the case of
monopsony power.15
In sum, our approach to recover estimates of markups and marginal costs
requires estimates of the parameters of the production function Fjt (·) at the
product level and the input allocations ρ̃fjt across products within each multiproduct firm. Section 3.2 discusses the production function estimation method
and the identification strategy we employ in order to obtain the output elasticities for both single- and multi-product firms.
3.2. Estimation
We take logs of equation (1) and allow for log-additive measurement error
and/or unanticipated shocks to output ( fjt ). To simplify notation, and since
we do not have enough data to estimate different production functions for
different time periods, we assume that the production function coefficients remain constant over the sample period and drop the subscript t in the writing
14

We discuss economies of scope in more detail in Section 3.5.
In principle, one could make the argument that trade policy might lead to exit of smaller,
less productive firms, which might give monopsony power to the remaining firms in the market.
In practice, we do not observe firm exit in our sample, so we do not consider such a scenario as
a likely explanation for our empirical results. We have explored heterogeneity in our results by
identifying business groups in our sample who may have some degree of monopsony power, but
we do not find differential effects with respect to the impacts of tariffs on their prices, markups,
and marginal costs (results available upon request).
15

460

DE LOECKER, GOLDBERG, KHANDELWAL, AND PAVCNIK

of the production function f (·). Log output is given by qfjt = ln(Qfjt exp( fjt )).
Letting xfjt be the vector of (log) physical inputs, xfjt = {vfjt  kfjt }, and ωf t be
ln(Ωf t ), we obtain
(7)

qfjt = fj (xfjt ; β) + ωf t +

fjt



By writing the production function in terms of physical output rather than revenue, we exploit separate information on quantities and prices that is available
in the data. The use of physical output in equation (7) eliminates concerns of
a price bias that arises if output is constructed by deflating firm revenues by an
industry-level price index.16
Unobserved productivity ωf t potentially leads to well-known simultaneity
and selection biases. These two biases have been the predominant focus of the
production function estimating literature and we follow the insights of Olley
and Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), and Ackerberg, Caves, and
Frazer (2015) in addressing them. Note that if we theoretically had data on
the physical inputs (vfjt  kfjt ) for all products, these existing approaches to estimating production functions would, in principle, suffice to obtain consistent
estimates of the production function coefficients β.
In reality, no data set records product-specific inputs, so estimating equation (7) requires dealing with two additional issues: (a) we do not observe
input allocations across products in multi-product firms; and (b) we observe
industry-wide deflated firm-level input expenditures rather than firm-level input quantities. The latter is not merely a measurement problem because firms
typically rely on differentiated inputs to manufacture differentiated products,
so physical input and output are not readily comparable across firms.
To understand the implications of these two issues for estimation, let x̃f t denote the (observed) vector of deflated input expenditures, deflated by a sectorspecific price index. From Assumption 4, product-level input quantities, xfjt ,
for each input x relate to firm-level expenditures as follows:
(8)

x
xfjt = ρfjt + x̃f t − wfjt


where ρfjt = ln ρ̃fjt is the (log) share of firm input expenditures allocated to
x
product j and wfjt
denotes the deviation of the unobserved (log) firm–productspecific input price from the (log) industry-wide input price index.17 By substi16

For a detailed discussion, see De Loecker (2011) and Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson
(2008).
17
We allow for multi-product firms to face different input prices in the production of their
various products. Accordingly, the input prices w are indexed by both f and j. This would be the
case if a multi-product firm manufactured products of different qualities that relied on inputs of
different qualities; see Section 3.2.2 for a discussion of the relationship between output and input
quality.
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tuting this expression for physical inputs into equation (7) and defining wfjt as
the vector of log firm–product-specific input prices, we obtain18
(9)

qfjt = fj (x̃f t ; β) + A(ρfjt  x̃f t  β) + B(wfjt  ρfjt  x̃f t  β) + ωf t +

fjt



Compared to equation (7), there are two additional unobserved terms in (9):
first, the term A(·) that arises from the unobserved product-level input allocations ρfjt , and second, the term B(·) that captures unobserved firm–productspecific input prices wfjt . The exact form of terms A(·) and B(·) depends on
the functional form of f (·). Both terms depend on the vector of coefficients β,
the input expenditures x̃f t , and the unobserved product-level input allocation
shares ρfjt . It is evident from (9) that even after controlling for the unobserved productivity ωf t using standard estimation techniques, the presence of
the terms A(·) and B(·) leads to biased production function coefficients since
both terms are correlated with the deflated input expenditures x̃f t . We refer to
the bias arising from the term A(·) as the “input allocation” bias and the bias
arising from B(·) as the “input price” bias. The methodology we develop in this
subsection addresses these biases.
Neither the “input allocation” nor the “input price” bias has received much
attention in the literature on production function estimation to date because
the standard practice regresses deflated sales on deflated expenditures at the
firm level.19 De Loecker and Goldberg (2014) discussed the conditions under
which these biases interact so as to produce reasonable estimates. But although
such estimates may look plausible, this does not imply that the coefficients are
consistent estimates of the production function. Failing to correct these biases
traces the elasticity of sales with respect to input expenditures, but that elasticity is not useful in our approach because equation (5) requires the elasticity of
output quantities with respect to input quantities.
To deal with these biases, we proceed in four steps. Section 3.2.1 explains how the estimation addresses the unobserved input allocation bias. Section 3.2.2 explains how to address the bias arising from unobserved input
prices. Section 3.2.3 explains our treatment of the unobserved productivity
shock and selection correction. Section 3.2.4 explains the moment conditions
and further elaborates on identification and estimation. The first two steps are
new to the literature on production function estimation; the last two steps build
on existing work.
18

To simplify notation, we will always use wfjt to denote the deviations of firm–product-specific
input prices from industry input price indexes. Similarly, from now on, we will use the term “firm
input prices” to denote firm-specific deviations from industry averages.
19
Katayama, Lu, and Tybout (2009) is the only study to our knowledge that acknowledges the
existence of the input price bias.
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3.2.1. Unobserved Input Allocations: The Use of Single-Product Firms
Assumptions 1 and 4 imply that a firm f ’s technology used to produce product j is independent of the other products manufactured by the firm. This also
implies that a multi-product firm uses the same technology as a single-product
firm producing the same product.20 We can therefore rely on single-product
firms to estimate the product-level production function in (9), without having to address the unobserved input allocations in multi-product firms. For
single-product firms, A(·) = 0 because, by definition, ρ̃fjt = 1. Since estimation
is based on the single-product sample, we omit the product subscript j for the
remainder of the exposition of the estimation algorithm.
Equation (9) simplifies to
(10)

qf t = f (x̃f t ; β) + B(wf t  x̃f t  β) + ωf t +

ft



The approach of using the single-product firm estimates to infer the production function coefficients for all firms raises the concern that the estimates may
suffer from a selection bias since we rely only on single-product firms in the
estimation. The selection bias arises if firms’ choice to add a second product
and become multi-product depends on the unobserved firm productivity ωf t
and/or firms’ input use. Our estimation procedure utilizes the selection correction insights from Olley and Pakes (1996) to address this potential selection
bias in two ways. First, we use an unbalanced panel that consists of firms that
are single-product at a given point in time. At time t, the unbalanced panel includes both firms who always remain single-product firms and those that manufacture a single product at t but add additional products at a later date. This
feature of the sample is important since many firms start off as single-product
firms and add products during our sample. The use of the unbalanced panel is
helpful in addressing the selection concern arising from the nonrandom event
that a firm becomes a multi-product producer based on unobserved productivity ωf t .21 Second, to account for the possibility that the productivity threshold
determining the transition of a firm from single- to multi-product status is correlated with production inputs (in particular, capital), we additionally apply a
sample selection correction procedure. We describe the details of the sample
selection correction procedure in Section 3.2.3.22
20
For example, imagine a single-product firm produces a T-shirt using a particular technology,
and another single-product firm produces carpets using a different combination of inputs. We
assume that a multi-product firm that manufactures both products will use each technology on its
respective product, rather than some third technology.
21
This nonrandom event of adding a second product results in a sample selection issue analogous to the nonrandom exit of firms discussed in Olley and Pakes (1996). In their context, Olley
and Pakes (1996) were concerned about the left tail of the productivity distribution; here, a balanced panel of single-product firms would censor the right tail of the productivity distribution.
The use of the unbalanced panel of single-product firms improves upon this selection problem.
22
Firms in our sample very rarely drop products, so we do not observe the reverse transition
from multi- to single-product status. We refer the reader to Goldberg et al. (2010b) for a detailed
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We consider three inputs in the (deflated) input expenditure vector x̃f t : labor (l̃), intermediate inputs (m̃), and capital (k̃). It is clear from equation (10)
that we still need to correct for the term related to unobserved firm-specific
input price variation, B(wf t  x̃f t  β), and the unobserved firm-level productivity
(ωf t ) in order to obtain consistent estimates of the production function parameters β, and hence the output elasticities that are used to compute markups
and marginal costs. We turn to these issues next.
3.2.2. Unobserved Input Prices
The treatment of unobserved input prices is important for two reasons. First,
we need to control for them in B(wf t  x̃f t  β) in equation (10) to recover consistent estimates of the production function parameters β.23 Second, the input
demand equation that is used to control for productivity ωf t naturally depends
on input prices (see Section 3.2.3).
In our framework (see Assumption 6), firm-specific input price variation can
arise through exogenous variation in input prices across local input markets
(Gf ) and/or variation in input quality (νf t ).24 This implies that two firms in
the same industry that produce in the same location only face the exact same
input prices if they buy the exact same input quality. We propose an approach
to control for unobserved input price variation across firms using information
on observables, particularly (but not exclusively) output prices. The intuition is
that output prices contain information about input prices. For example, using
data from Colombia that uniquely record price information for both inputs and
outputs, Kugler and Verhoogen (2011) documented that producers of more
expensive products also use more expensive inputs.
We provide a formal model that rationalizes our approach to control for input prices in Appendix A. We show that in a large class of models of consumer
demand and imperfect competition used in the Industrial Organization and International Trade literatures, we can proxy for unobserved input prices using a
function of the firm’s output price, market share, and product dummies. Here,
we sketch the main argument and provide the economic intuition underlying
our empirical strategy.
We define product quality as the mean utility associated with consuming a
product net of price. Product quality can be modeled as a function of observanalysis of product adding and dropping in our data. Unlike Olley and Pakes (1996), we are also
not concerned with firm exit. Firm exit is rare in our data because Prowess covers the medium
and large firms in India.
23
This subsection considers single-product firms since we use only these firms to estimate the
production functions, but all relationships described below also apply to multi-product firms (in
which case all relevant variables should be indexed by j).
24
We abstract from lagged action variables af t−1 , since we do not have rich enough data to
measure these (e.g., past contracts specifying input prices independent of quantities).

464

DE LOECKER, GOLDBERG, KHANDELWAL, AND PAVCNIK

able and unobservable product characteristics. Intuitively, our quality concept
encompasses all attributes that increase the utility consumers receive from consuming the product, conditional on its price. The main premise of our correction procedure is that manufacturing high-quality products requires highquality inputs, and that high-quality inputs are expensive. We further assume
complementarity in input quality: manufacturing high-quality products requires
combining high-quality materials with high-quality labor and capital. This is a
common assumption in the literature and underlies ‘O-Ring’-type theories of
production (e.g., Kremer (1993), Verhoogen (2008), Kugler and Verhoogen
(2011)). This complementarity implies that the prices of all inputs facing a firm
can be expressed as functions of a single index of product quality. We assume
that all firms producing the same product category (e.g., apparel) face the same
production function for quality, but allow the production function for quality
to differ across product categories (e.g., between apparel and food products).
Appendix A shows that input prices are an increasing function of product quality in this setting. Accordingly, we can control for input price variation across
firms using differences in output quality across firms.
Given that input prices are an increasing function of input quality, which is
an increasing function of output quality, we can use the variables proxying for
output quality (i.e., output price, market share, and product dummies) to proxy
for input prices. Formally, we write input prices wfxt as a function of output
quality νf t and firm location Gf :25
(11)

wfxt = wt (νf t  Gf )

This expression for input prices generalizes Assumption 6 to all inputs. Appendix A shows that the input price control function wt will generally be inputspecific (so it should be indexed by x). As we discuss in Appendix A and
elaborate in Section 3.5.2, allowing for input-specific input price control functions always allows one to identify the coefficients of the production function β.
However, in this general case, one will not be able to identify the coefficients of
the input price control function, which are needed in our application to compute the input allocations ρfjt (and markups) for multi-product firms in Sections 3.3 and 3.4. Therefore, we impose the same control function wt across all
inputs.
Using the results from Appendix A, we get
(12)

wfxt = wt (pf t  msf t  Df  Gf  EXPf t )

25
We remind the reader that we have defined the input price wfxt for input x as the deviation of
the actual input price from the relevant input price index (i.e., the weighted industry mean), and
x
therefore wfxt = 0 for the producer paying exactly the (weighted) average w̄tx . Formally, wfjt
=
x∗
− w̄jtx , where ∗ denotes the actual input price faced by firm f for its product j at time t.
wfjt
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where pf t is the output price of the firm, msf t is a vector of market shares,
Df captures the vector of product dummies, and EXPf t denotes the export
status of a firm.26 It is important to note that our approach to control for unobserved input quality does not assume that products are only vertically differentiated. It allows for horizontal differentiation, but horizontal differentiation
is costless. In contrast, differentiation along the vertical dimension requires
higher quality inputs that have higher input prices. This assumption is common in trade models (e.g., Verhoogen (2008), Khandelwal (2010)). Moreover,
because we model output quality as a flexible function of output prices, market share, and product dummies, the approach does not require us to commit
to a particular demand function since it encompasses a large class of demand
models used in the literature. For example, in a purely vertical differentiation
model, there is a one-to-one mapping between product quality and product
prices, so output prices perfectly proxy for quality; in this case, one would
not require controls for market share or product characteristics. In the simple logit model, quality is a function of output prices and market shares (see
Khandelwal (2010) for a detailed exposition). In more general models, such
as the nested logit or random coefficients models, quality is a function of additional variables, such as product characteristics, conditional market shares, etc.
While product characteristics are typically not observed in manufacturing surveys, product dummies can proxy for the unobserved product characteristics
(as long as these do not change over time) and accommodate these more general demand specifications as in Berry (1994). Finally, using output prices as a
proxy for quality does not imply that we assume complete pass-through of input to output prices; the degree of pass-through is dictated by the (unspecified)
underlying demand and market structure and by the firm behavioral assumptions. Accordingly, the approach is consistent with any degree of pass-through
between input and output prices.
The final step is to substitute the input price control function from (12) into
the expression for wf t in B(wf t  x̃f t  β) in equation (10); we get

(13)
B(wf t  x̃f t  β) = B (pf t  msf t  Df  Gf  EXPf t ) × x̃cf t ; β δ 
A few words on notation are in order. The function B(·) is different from the
input price function w(·) as described in equation (12). The function B(·) depends on the input prices wf t and will therefore take as arguments the elements
of w(·). However, it also contains interactions of the input prices (wf t ) with the
vector of deflated input expenditures x̃f t . We use the notation x̃cf t to highlight
the fact that the input price term w(·) enters also by itself, without being interacted with the input expenditures x̃f t , and thus we include a constant term:
26

We include the export status of a firm to allow for market demand conditions in export
destinations to differ from the domestic market. In our data, we do not observe the productdestination trade flows for each firm. Otherwise, this information could be included here.
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x̃cf t = {1 x̃f t }. The notation highlights that the use of the input price control
function requires us to estimate an additional parameter vector δ alongside
the production function parameters β.
3.2.3. Unobserved Productivity and Selection Correction
The only remaining source of potential bias in (10) is the unobserved firmlevel productivity ωf t . Firms’ choices of inputs and number of products are in
part affected by this (to the econometrician) unobserved productivity, potentially leading to simultaneity and selection bias in estimation. We control for
unobserved productivity ωf t in (10) using a control function based on a static
input demand equation. In addition, we implement a selection correction for
the potential selection bias stemming from the use of single-product firms in
the estimation procedure, discussed in Section 3.2.1. We describe both procedures here.
We follow the literature on production function estimation, as initiated by
Olley and Pakes (1996) and extended by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), and
control for unobserved productivity ωf t in (10) using a static input demand
equation. The materials demand function in our setting will take as arguments
all state variables of the firm noted in Assumption 5, including productivity,
and all additional variables that affect a firm’s demand for materials. These
include firm location (Gf ), output prices (pf t ), product dummies (Df ), market
shares (msf t ), input prices (wt (·)), the export status of a firm (EXPf t ), and the
input
output
input (τit ) and output tariffs (τit ) that the firm faces on the product it
produces. From (12), input prices are themselves a function of output price,
market share, and product dummies,27 so materials demand is given by

input
output
m̃f t = mt ωf t  k̃f t  l̃f t  Gf  pf t  Df  msf t  EXPf t  τit  τit
(14)

We collect all the variables determining intermediate input demand, except
for the input expenditures and unobserved productivity, in zf t = {Gf  pf t  Df 
input
output
msf t  EXPf t  τit  τit }. The number of products (Jf t ) is omitted from the set
of state variables since the sample we use for estimation contains only singleproduct firms. The subscript i on the tariff variables denotes an industry to
indicate that tariffs vary at a higher level of aggregation than products. Inverting (14) gives our control function for productivity:28
(15)

ωf t = ht (x̃f t  zf t )

27
Note that we consider (log) intermediate input expenditure, defined as the sum (in logs) of
the intermediate input demand and the input price. This implies that the materials expenditure
function m̃t (·) takes as arguments the same variables as the physical materials demand function
mt (·): mf t = mt (wfmt  ·) and m̃f t = mt (·) + wfmt = m̃t (wfmt  ·), where wfmt is the input price.
28
As discussed in Olley and Pakes (1996), the proxy approach does not require knowledge of
the market structure for the input markets; it simply states that input demand depends on the
firm’s state variables and variables affecting input demand. By using a static control to proxy
for productivity, we do not have to revisit the underlying dynamic model and prove invertibil-

PRICES, MARKUPS, AND TRADE REFORM

467

Our approach also encompasses a selection correction to address the potential selection bias stemming from the use of only single-product firms in the
estimation discussed in Section 3.2.1. The selection bias arises if a firm’s choice
to add a second product and become a multi-product firm depends on unobserved firm productivity ωf t in equation (10) and/or the firm’s input use. Following Olley and Pakes (1996), who addressed the selection bias due to plant
exit in their setting, we model the probability that a firm continues to produce
one product nonparametrically as a function of the firm’s productivity forecast
and all state variables sf t .
The underlying model behind our sample selection correction is one where
the number of products manufactured by firms increases with productivity. Several multi-product firm models generate this correlation, with Mayer,
Melitz, and Ottaviano (2014) matching our setup most closely. In that model,
the number of products a firm produces is an increasing step function of the
firms’ productivity. Firms have a productivity draw which determines their core
product. Conditional on entry, the firm produces this core product and incurs
an increasingly higher marginal cost of production for each additional product
it manufactures. This structure generates a competence ladder that is characterized by a set of cutoff points, each associated with the introduction of an
additional product.29
The cutoff point relevant to our sample selection procedure is the one associated with the introduction of a second product. We denote this cutoff by ω̄f t .
Firms with productivity that exceeds ω̄f t are multi-product firms that produce
two (or more) products, while firms below ω̄f t remain single-product producers and are included in the estimation sample.
If the threshold ω̄f t is independent of the right-hand-side variables in the
production function in equation (10), there is no selection bias and we obtain consistent estimates of production function coefficients (as long as we use
the unbalanced panel of single product firms, i.e., the sample of firms that are
single-product at any point in time, but may become multi-product in the future). A bias arises when the threshold is a function of capital and/or labor. For
example, it is possible that even conditional on productivity, a firm with more
ity when modifying Olley and Pakes (1996) for our setting to include additional state variables
(e.g., tariffs). See De Loecker (2011) and Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2015) for an extensive
discussion. A recent literature has discussed alternative estimation procedures that do not rely
on this inversion. In the absence of shocks to output f t , these procedures can be implemented
without additional assumptions. However, the f t shocks end up being important, especially when
estimating physical output production functions, where the f t ’s absorb unit fixed effects.
29
Alternative models such as Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2010) introduce firm–productspecific demand shocks that generate product switching (e.g., product addition and dropping)
in each period. We avoid this additional complexity since product dropping is not a prominent
feature of our data (Goldberg et al. (2010b)). Moreover, in Section 4, we find strong support that
firms’ marginal costs are lower on their core competent products (products that have higher sales
shares).
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capital finds it easier to finance the introduction of an additional product; or,
a firm that employs more workers may have an easier time expanding into new
product lines. In these cases, firms with more capital and/or labor are less likely
to be single-product firms, even conditional on productivity, and this generates
a negative bias in the capital and labor coefficients.
To address the selection bias, we allow the threshold ω̄f t to be a function of
the state variables sf t and the firm’s information set at time It−1 (we assume the
decision to add a product is made in the previous period). The selection rule
requires that the firm make its decision to add a product based on a forecast of
these variables in the future. Define an indicator function χf t to be equal to 1
if the firm remains single-product (SP) and 0 otherwise. The selection rule can
be written as


Pr(χf t = 1) = Pr ωf t ≤ ω̄f t (sf t )|ω̄f t (sf t ) ωf t−1
(16)

= κt−1 ω̄f t (sf t ) ωf t−1
(17)

= κt−1 (x̃f t−1  if t−1  zf t−1 )
≡ SPf t 

Note that the variables included in z are a subset of the state variables that
appear in s (the latter include the dynamic inputs that are part of x̃). We
use the fact that the threshold at t is predicted using the firm’s state variables at t − 1, the accumulation equation for capital, and ωf t = ht (x̃f t  zf t )
from equation (15) to arrive at the last equation.30 As in Olley and Pakes
(1996), we have two different indexes of firm heterogeneity, the productivity
and the productivity cutoff point. Note that SPf t = κt−1 (ωf t−1  ω̄f t ) and therefore ω̄f t = κ−1
t−1 (ωf t−1  SPf t ).
3.2.4. Productivity Process, Moment Conditions, and Identification
To estimate the parameter vectors β and δ, we follow Ackerberg, Caves, and
Frazer (2015) and form moments based on the innovation in the productivity
shock ξf t . We consider the following law of motion for productivity:
(18)


output
input
ωf t = g ωf t−1  τit−1  τit−1  EXPf t−1  SPf t + ξf t 

The tariff variables and export dummy are included in the law of motion to
account for the fact that trade policy and exporting may affect productivity.
The accumulation equation for capital is Kf t = (1 − δ)Kf t−1 + If t−1 , where δ is the depreciation rate of capital. The specification of the selection rule takes into account that firms hire
and/or fire workers based on their labor force at time t − 1 and their forecast of future demand
and costs captured by z and ω. So all variables entering the nonparametric function κt−1 (·) help
predict the firm’s employment at time t.
30
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As De Loecker (2013) showed, if one expects these variables to have an effect on productivity, then the theoretically consistent treatment is to include
them directly in the law of motion. Otherwise, their omission may lead to biased production function coefficients. Of course, the fact that these variables
are allowed to have an impact on productivity does not mean that they will in
fact have an effect. It is entirely possible that the empirical estimates indicate
that the trade variables have no effect on productivity. Hence, including trade
variables in the law of motion does not assume a particular result regarding the
effects of tariffs or exporting on productivity.
Trade-related variables are expected to affect productivity through both
exporting and importing channels. For example, a large literature suggests
“learning by exporting” effects. Likewise, trade economists have postulated
that a reduction in output tariffs that exposes firms to intensified import competition may lead to reduction in X-inefficiencies and adoption of better management practices. In this case, output tariff reductions may lead to productivity improvements. On the input side, input tariff reductions may lead to the
import of new, previously unavailable intermediate products, which will lead
to increases in productivity (see Halpern, Koren, and Szeidl (2011) for a formalization of this argument). We emphasize that the specification we adopt
for the law of motion for productivity in equation (18) allows for these mechanisms to generate productivity improvements, but by no means assumes the
result. The inclusion of the probability that a firm remains single-product in
the next period SPf t in the law of motion addresses the selection correction
from equation (16). In principle, there could be additional variables that affect
firm productivity (e.g., a firm’s R&D), but we do not include those in the law
of motion as we have no information on them in our data.
To form moments based on the innovation in the productivity shock in (18),
one needs to express the productivity ωf t as a function of data and parameters. Plugging the expressions for the input price correction from (13) and for
unobserved productivity from (15) into the production function equation (10),
we get
(19)

qf t = φt (x̃f t  zf t ) +

ft



where we remind the reader that the vector zf t includes all variables that affect
intermediate input demand, except for the input expenditures and unobserved
productivity:
input

zf t = Gf  pf t  Df  msf t  EXPf t  τit

output

 τit



and the term φt (·) is equal to f (x̃f t ; β) + B(wf t  x̃f t  β) + ωf t and captures
output net of noise f t .
Estimation of (19) enables one to get rid of unanticipated shocks and/or
measurement error f t . We note that although the variables proxying for input
prices (see equation (12)) also enter the input demand equation in equation
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(15), this has no implications for the identification of the production function
parameters. The only purpose of the first-stage estimation is to purge the output quantity data from unanticipated shocks and/or measurement error (i.e.,
purge f t in equation (10)).31 For example, output prices (pf t ) enter this first
stage to control for both unobserved productivity and input price differences,
but we do not need to distinguish between them when forecasting output. Note
that even if we observed (quality-corrected) input prices, we would still include
output prices and the function φt (·) would reflect this.
The first stage of the estimation in (19) yields an estimate of predicted output φ̂f t .32 One can then express productivity ωf t as a function of data and parameters. In particular, using equations (10), (13), and (19), we have
(20)


ωf t (β δ) = φ̂f t − f (x̃f t ; β) − B (pf t  msf t  Df  Gf  EXPf t ) × x̃cf t ; δ 

where the last term, the function B(·), represents the input price control function.33
It is important to note that even though the input expenditures x̃f t enter
both the production function f (·) and the input price control function B(·),
the coefficients of the production function β are identified because x̃f t enter
the input price control function in (13) only interacted with input prices, or
put differently, the input expenditures do not enter the input price function
w(·) in (12). This identification insight does not rest on any functional form
assumptions; it results from the fact that the control function for quality, and
hence input prices, rests on the demand side alone and hence does not include
input expenditures.
The main parameters of interest to compute markups are the vector of production function coefficients β. However, from (13), note that the parameter
vector δ allows us to identify the input prices: after we have estimated β and δ,
we can recover the input prices from equation (12).34
31
We could set f t = 0; in this case, we no longer need to invert the input demand function
to control for unobserved productivity. However, we feel that the input demand specification
addresses first-order empirical issues with the data: measurement error in output and differences
in units across products within sectors, which are absorbed by unit fixed effects in the first stage.
32
In practice, we approximate the function φt (·) with a third-order polynomial in all its elements, with the exception of product dummies. We add the product dummies linearly to avoid
having to estimate all cross terms. This seems innocuous since the first-stage R2 is very close
to 1.
33
We approximate B(·) with a flexible third-order polynomial. At this point, the reader might
find it useful to consider a special case of a Cobb–Douglas production function and a vertical differentiation model of consumer demand. In this special case, equation (20) reduces to
ωf t (β δ) = φf t − x̃f t β − Γ wt (pf t ; δ), where Γ denotes the returns to scale parameter. Please
see Appendix B for details.
34
In other words, we specify the function w(·) and therefore the δ parameters are a function
of both the production function coefficients β, and the parameters in w(·). It is at this stage
where we need the assumption that the function w(·) does not vary across inputs. If we allowed

PRICES, MARKUPS, AND TRADE REFORM

471

To estimate the parameter vectors β and δ, we form moments based on the
innovation in the productivity shock ξf t in law of motion in equation (18). We
use (20) to project ωf t (·) on the elements of g(·) to obtain the innovation ξf t
as a function of the parameters ξf t (β δ):
(21)

ξf t (β δ) = ωf t (β δ)

output
input
− E ωf t (β δ)|ωf t−1 (β δ) τit−1  τit−1  EXPf t−1  SPf t 

The moments that identify the parameters are

(22)
E ξf t (β δ)Yf t = 0
where Yf t contains lagged materials, current capital, and labor, and their
higher order and interaction terms, as well as lagged output prices, lagged
market shares, lagged tariffs, and their appropriate interactions with the inputs.
This method identifies the production function coefficients by exploiting the
fact that current shocks to productivity will immediately affect a firm’s materials choice while labor and capital do not immediately respond to these shocks;
moreover, the degree of adjustment can vary across firms and time. These moments that rely on adjustment costs in inputs are by now standard in this literature. In our context, we assume that firms freely adjust materials and treat
capital and labor as dynamic inputs that face adjustment costs. In other settings, one may choose to treat labor as a flexible input. Since materials are the
flexible input, we use lagged materials when we construct moments.35
We use lagged output prices, market shares, and tariffs and their interactions with appropriately lagged inputs to form additional moment conditions
to identify jointly the production function coefficients β and the coefficients δ
capturing the input price variation. For example, the parameter related to the
output price is identified off the moment E(ξt pt−1 ) = 0; this moment condition is based on the insight that current prices do react to productivity shocks,
so we need to use lagged output prices which exploit the serial correlation of
prices.
We estimate the model using a GMM procedure on a sample of firms that
manufacture a single product for at least three consecutive years.36 We choose
for input-specific w(·) functions, we would still be able to consistently estimate the parameter
vectors β and δ, but we would not be able to identify the input-specific coefficients of the w(·)
functions from β and δ. See Appendix B for a more detailed discussion based on a Cobb–Douglas
production function.
35
In our setting, input tariffs are serially correlated and since they affect input prices, input
prices are serially correlated over time, creating a link between current and lagged intermediate
input usage.
36
We follow the procedure suggested by Wooldridge (2009) that forms moments on the joint
error term (ξf t + f t ).
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three years since the moment conditions require at least two years of data because of the lagged values; we add an additional (third) year to allow for potential measurement error in the precise timing of a new product introduction.
We discuss the timing assumptions further in Section 3.5.2. In principle, one
could run the estimation separately for each product. In practice, our sample
size is too small to allow estimation at the product level, so we estimate (10) at
the two-digit sector level.37
Estimation of equation (10) requires choosing a functional form for f .
We adopt a translog specification because of its flexibility.38 Specifically, the
translog offers the advantage that it generates output elasticities that are not
constant over time and across firms (though the production coefficients are
constrained to be the same across years and firms); hence, large firms can have
different elasticities than small firms. The exact functional form for f (·) does
not generate any identification results. The crucial assumption is that productivity enters in a log-additive fashion (Assumption 3 in Section 3.1).
Finally, the standard errors on the coefficients are obtained using blockbootstrapping, where we draw an entire firm time series. Since our ultimate objective is to estimate the impact of the trade reforms on markups and marginal
costs, we correct the standard errors of the regressions in Section 4 by blockbootstrapping over our entire empirical procedure.
3.3. Recovering Input Allocations
As shown in equations (5) and (6), computing markups and marginal costs
requires the product-specific output elasticity and product-specific revenue
shares on a variable input (in our case, materials). We obtain the output elasticity from the estimation outlined in Section 3.2 based on single-product firms,
but we do not know the product-specific revenue shares of inputs for multiproduct firms. Here, we show how to compute the input allocations across
products of a multi-product firm in order to construct αM
fjt .
W X Xfjt

From Assumption 6, recall that ρfjt = ln( fjtX ) ∀X ∈ {V  K} is product
ft
j’s input cost share. We solve for ρfjt in multi-product firms as follows. We
first eliminate unanticipated shocks and measurement error from the productlevel output data by following the same procedure as in the first stage of
our estimation routine for the single-product firms in (19). We project qfjt
on the exact same variables used in the first stage of the estimation procedure, q̂fjt ≡ E(qfjt |φt (x̃f t  zf t )), which allows us to eliminate any measurement error and unanticipated shocks to output from the recorded output
data.
37
This follows the standard practice in the literature where production functions are estimated
at the industry level. For example, see Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).
38
The translog production function is qf t = βl lf t + βll lf2 t + βk kf t + βkk k2f t + βm mf t + βmm m2f t +
βlk lf t kf t + βlm lf t mf t + βmk mf t kf t + βlmk lf t mf t kf t + ωf t .
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Given the aforementioned assumptions that productivity is firm-specific and
log-additive and that inputs are divisible across products, we can rewrite the
production function as
q̂fjt = f (x̃f t  β̂ ŵfjt  ρfjt ) + ωf t 
and recover {{ρfjt }Jj=1  ωf t } using
(23)
(24)

q̂fjt − f1 (x̃f t  β̂ ŵfjt ) = f2 (x̃f t  ŵfjt  ρfjt ) + ωf t 

exp(ρfjt ) = 1
j

where f1 and f2 depend on the functional form of the production function
and the input prices ŵfjt for each product j are computed based on the input price function (12). In other words, to recover the input allocations ρfjt ,
we separate the production function into a component f1 that captures all
terms that do not depend on ρfjt and a component f2 that collects all terms
that involve ρfjt . Because the input allocation shares have to sum up to 1
across all products in a multi-product firm, this yields a system of Jf t + 1 equations (where Jf t is the number of products produced by firm f at time t) in
Jf t + 1 unknowns (the Jf t input allocations ρfjt and ωf t ) for each firm–year
pair.
Let ω̂fjt = q̂fjt − f1 (x̃f t  β̂ wf t ). Applying our translog functional form to
(23), we obtain
(25)

ω̂fjt = ωf t + âfjt ρfjt + b̂fjt ρ2fjt + ĉfjt ρ3fjt 

The terms âf t , b̂f t , and ĉf t are functions of the estimated parameter vector β̂
and the estimated input price correction ŵfjt .39
39

For the translog, these terms are
2
âf t = β̂k + β̂l + 3ŵfjt
β̂lmk + l̃f t (β̂lk + 2β̂ll + β̂lm + k̃f t β̂lmk + m̃f t β̂lmk − 2ŵfjt β̂lmk )

+ β̂m + k̃f t (2β̂kk + β̂lk + m̃f t β̂lmk ) + k̃f t (−2ŵfjt β̂lmk + β̂mk )
+ ŵfjt (−2β̂kk − 2β̂lk − 2β̂ll − 2β̂lm − 2β̂mk − 2β̂mm )
+ m̃f t (β̂lm − 2ŵfjt β̂lmk + β̂mk + 2β̂mm )
b̂f t = β̂kk + β̂lk + β̂ll + β̂lm + β̂lmk k̃f t + β̂lmk l̃f t + β̂lmk m̃f t − 3ŵfjt β̂lmk + β̂mk + β̂mm 
ĉf t = β̂lmk 
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For each year, we obtain the firm’s productivity and input allocations,
the J + 1 unknowns (ωf t  ρf 1t      ρfJt ), by solving a system of J + 1 equations:
(26)

ω̂f 1t = ωf t + âf 1t ρf 1t + b̂f 1t ρ2f 1t + ĉf 1t ρ3f 1t 

(27)



(28)

ω̂f Jt t = ωf t + âf Jt t ρf Jt t + b̂f Jt t ρ2f Jt t + ĉf Jt t ρ3f Jt t 

(29)

J


exp(ρfjt ) = 1

exp(ρfjt ) ≤ 1

∀fjt

j=1

This system imposes the economic restriction that each input share can never
exceed 1 and they must together sum up to 1 across products in a firm. We
numerically solve this system for each firm in each year.
3.4. Markups and Marginal Costs
We can now apply our framework to compute markups and marginal costs
using the estimates of the production function coefficients (β) and the input
allocations (ρ). We calculate the markup for each product–firm pair f j in each
time period t using
(30)

M
μ̂fjt = θ̂fjt

Pfjt Qfjt
exp(ρ̂fjt )XfMt



M
= θ(β̂ x̃f t  ŵfj  ρ̂fjt ) and XfMt denotes the firm’s expenditure on mawhere θ̂fjt
terials.
M
is a function of
The product-specific output elasticity for materials θ̂fjt
the production function coefficients and the materials allocated to product j.
Hence, it can be easily computed once the allocation of inputs across products
has been recovered.40 Marginal costs mcfjt are then recovered by dividing price
by the relevant markup according to equation (6).
Note that both markups and marginal costs are estimates since they depend
on the estimated production function coefficients and the input cost allocation parameters, which are estimates themselves since they depend on the
production function coefficients. Hence, the only source of uncertainty in our
markup (and marginal cost) estimates comes from using estimated coefficients

M
40
The expression for the materials output elasticity for product j at time t is θ̂fjt
= β̂m +
2β̂mm mfjt + β̂lm lfjt + β̂mk kfjt + β̂lmk lfjt kfjt . As before, to obtain the physical inputs, we rely on
our estimates of the input prices ŵfjt and the input allocation shares ρ̂fjt .
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(the production function coefficients β̂ and the input price correction coefficients δ̂). We account for the measurement error in these variables when we
estimate the reduced form regressions in Section 4 by bootstrapping over the
entire procedure. We execute the following steps in sequence: (1) estimate the
production function, (2) recover the input allocations, (3) calculate markups
(marginal costs), and (4) project markups and costs on trade policy variables.
We then repeat this procedure 500 times, using bootstrapped (with replacement) samples that keep the sample size equal to the original sample size. This
allows us to compute the bootstrapped standard error on the trade policy coefficients in Section 4.
3.5. Discussion
In addition to the conceptual assumptions discussed in Section 3.1, the actual implementation of the approach requires a set of assumptions to accommodate limitations of the data. Some of these limitations are specific to our
data set (e.g., we do not have information on physical labor units and wages,
but only the wage bill) and may be of little general relevance. But other limitations are present in every firm-level data set and will need to be addressed by
any study using such data. To our knowledge, no data set reports the allocation
of input expenditures across products in multi-product firms or contains the
complete information on the firm-specific input prices (including firm-specific
price of capital). The additional assumptions we impose are needed in order
to deal with these features of the data. Apart from measurement issues, the
assumptions we employ also address challenges that arise from product differentiation.
In this section, we discuss these additional assumptions and our identification strategy. We start by discussing the way we deal with the unobserved input
allocations in multi-product firms.
3.5.1. The Use of Single-Product Firms: Economies of Scope and Relationship to
Cost Function Estimation
This subsection expands on the discussion of economies of scope in our
setting and relates it to discussion of economies of scope in the cost function literature. Our approach does not rule out economies (or diseconomies)
of scope, which may be important for multi-product firms. Panzar (1989) defined economies of scope in terms of cost. Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1983)
spoke of economies of scope in production if the cost function is sub-additive:
cf t ([q1  q2 ] wf t  ω2f t ) ≤ cf t ([q1  0] wf t  ω1f t ) + cf t ([0 q2 ] wf t  ω1f t ), where cf t (·)
is a firm’s cost function, ωf t is (log) factor-neutral productivity, and wf t denotes a vector of (log) input prices. The superscripts in the productivity denote
the number of products produced by a firm. Our framework allows for factorneutral productivity to depend on the number of products produced by a firm.
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The assumption we impose is that the function c(·) is the same across
single- and multi-product firms producing the same product. However, costs
between the two types of firms can still differ if there are factor-neutral productivity differences between multi- and single-product firms. To see this, consider the thought experiment of splitting a firm that produces two products
into two sub-firms, each of which produces only one product. Economies of
scope will exist if cf t (q1  q2  wf t  ω2f t ) < cf t (q1  wf t  ω1f t ) + cf t (q2  wf t  ω1f t ). Note
that this condition is conceptually distinct from the equation implied by Assumption 4, which states that it is possible to allocate all input expenditures
of a multi-product firm to individual products, that is, cf t (q1  q2  wf t  ω2f t ) =
cf t (q1  wf t  ω2f t ) + cf t (q2  wf t  ω2f t ). The indexing of productivity by the number of products is important here. When we allocate expenditures of a multiproduct firm to individual products, we hold the firm’s productivity constant. In
contrast, in the counterfactual of splitting a firm into two subdivisions, we allow
for the productivity of each subdivision to be different than the productivity of
the original multi-product firm. The dependence of productivity on the number
of products a firm produces could arise for several reasons. For example, it is
possible that there is learning associated with the production of multiple products, or additional managerial experience that makes the firm more efficient;
and vice versa, it is possible that the production of multiple lines overwhelms
managers, resulting in a decline in total factor-productivity.
A further possibility (not borne out in our notation) is that factor prices w
differ across the two types of firms because of pre-negotiated contracts. Such
differences are consistent with our assumptions regarding input prices as long
as the contracts do not specify bulk discounts that would make current input
prices a function of current input quantities. For example, it is possible in our
framework for a firm such as Walmart to have lower input prices because it has
negotiated good deals with its suppliers in the past; but we do not allow the
price Walmart faces on each delivery of supplies to be a function of the size
of the delivery. We do not have any data on pre-negotiated prices that would
allow us to investigate this possibility, so we do not go down this road empirically. Finally, economies of scope can arise in the short run because of the
amortization of fixed costs F across multiple products for multi-product firms.
We emphasize that we allow for economies of scope rather than assume it. For
example, our results could find no productivity differences between single- and
multi-product firms, or find that multi-product firms are less productive, implying diseconomies of scope. Likewise, finding economies of scope in the range
of our data does not imply existence of economies of scope over any range of
products produced by a firm; it is possible that economies of scope switch to
diseconomies once a firm reaches a certain number of products. This paper
does not attempt to provide a theory of multi-product firms. We simply point
out that our approach does not a priori rule out economies or diseconomies of
scope in the range of our data.
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The discussion above raises the natural question of why we do not exploit
the duality between production and cost function and estimate a multi-product
cost function. The main reason for focusing on the production function is that
we do not have information on firm costs (as we do not observe the firmspecific user cost of capital) or wages. Furthermore, a multi-product cost function estimation would require additional identification assumptions in order
to deal with the endogeneity of multiple product outputs on the right-hand
side. Finally, even if one could come up with such identification assumptions,
the product portfolios in our particular context are not stable. While Indian
firms very rarely drop products, they often add products during this period (see
Goldberg et al. (2010b)). These frequent additions require explicitly modeling
a firm’s decision to add a particular product (in contrast, our approach requires
us to model only the change from single- to multi-product status). Given these
challenges, the approach to estimate production functions from single-product
firms while accounting for the potential selection bias is an appealing alternative.
3.5.2. Control Function for Input Prices and Timing Assumptions
This subsection explains how the control function for input prices, the law of
motion for productivity, and the timing assumptions allow us to identify the coefficients. Recall that the identification strategy involves two control functions
for the two unobservables: input prices and productivity:
(31)
(32)

wf t = wt (pf t  msf t  Df  Gf  EXPf t )

output
input
ωf t = g ωf t−1  τit−1  τit−1  EXPf t−1  SPf t + ξf t 

While ωf t enters the production function (10) linearly, the input prices enter
nonlinearly as part of the term B(·). By substituting the input price control
function into the expression for w, we get equation (13).
First, note that we make use of the input price control function in the first
stage of the estimation, when we purge the data from the noise . At this stage,
we use materials as a proxy for productivity. Given that materials demand depends on input prices, it is important to control for the input prices using the
control function specified above. However, the first stage has no implications
for the identification of the production function coefficients; its sole purpose is
to net out .
Next, consider the identification of the production function coefficients β
and the coefficients associated with the input price correction term δ. These
are identified off our timing assumptions. To review these assumptions, we assume that materials are a freely adjustable input and hence they will be correlated with contemporaneous productivity. Similarly, output prices will be correlated with current productivity. In contrast, capital and labor are dynamic in-
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puts. Therefore, they will be uncorrelated with the productivity innovation ξf t .
We rely on these assumptions to form moment conditions.41
There are two remaining identification issues that need to be discussed.
First, as we noted earlier, the term B(·) will, in general, include input expenditures x̃f t . This raises the question of whether the production coefficients β are
identified. They are identified because the input expenditures x̃f t enter the input price term B(·) only through interaction with the input prices. It is because
of the complexity of the translog that x̃f t appear in B(·) through interactions
with input prices. In a Cobb–Douglas specification, the input expenditures do
not appear in B(·). In fact, under a constant returns to scale Cobb–Douglas
production function, the input correction term B(·) simplifies to w(·).42
The second question is how the coefficients on variables that enter both the
law of motion for productivity and the input price control function are identified. One example of such a variable is the export dummy. The law of motion for productivity includes a dummy for exporting in t − 1, while it is also
included in the input price control. The answer is that these coefficients are
again identified off timing assumptions. We assume that productivity responds
with a lag to changes in a firm’s environment, since it plausibly takes time for
a firm to take the actions required to increase its efficiency (e.g., hiring better managers, adopting better management practices, changing organizational
structure, importing new intermediate inputs, etc.). Accordingly, variables that
may influence a firm’s productivity, such as tariffs or exporting, enter with a lag
in the law of motion of productivity. In contrast, output and input prices respond immediately to changes in the economic environment. Accordingly, the
variables included in the input price control function enter with their current
values. As noted earlier, it is precisely because these variables enter with their
current values that we face an identification problem; the current values will
be correlated with ξf t since, by assumption, they respond to contemporaneous
shocks. It is this potential correlation that leads us to form moment conditions
based on the lags, and not the current values, of the corresponding variables
(the vector Yf t contains lagged output prices, lagged market shares, etc.).
As noted in Section 3.2.2, we assume that there is a single input price control function across all inputs, wt (·). This assumption allows us to identify the
coefficients of the input price control function once the parameter vectors β
and δ have been estimated. The coefficients of the wt (·) function are required
41
These timing assumptions are standard in the production function estimation literature. For
example, both Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) assumed that capital is a
dynamic input and used this assumption to identify the capital coefficient. Our treatment of capital is identical to its treatment in those papers. Our treatment of labor differs, as we treat labor
as a dynamic input, while the aforementioned papers assumed that labor is static. This difference
is due to our effort to use assumptions that match the institutional setting in India, a country
characterized by significant labor market rigidities. However, the assumption that labor is a dynamic input has no significant implications for our identification strategy; we can easily modify
the assumptions to treat labor as a static input and adjust the moment conditions accordingly.
42
See Appendix B for details of the special case of Cobb–Douglas.
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to compute firm- and product-specific input prices that are then used to obtain input allocations ρfjt in multi-product firms in Section 3.3. Without the
assumption of a common control function for the prices of all inputs, we would
still be able to estimate the production function coefficients consistently, but
the parameter vector δ would, in this case, be a function of all parameters of
the input-specific input price control functions. Because our data do not report
firm-specific input prices, it would be impossible to identify the parameters of
each input price control function in our case (see the particular example of a
Cobb–Douglas production function in Appendix B). However, some data sets
report input prices for a subset of (though never for all) firms’ inputs. With
this additional information, it would be possible to specify and estimate inputspecific input price control functions.
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
4.1. Output Elasticities, Marginal Costs, and Markups
In this subsection, we present the output elasticities recovered from the production function estimation procedure. We describe how failing to correct for
input price variation or account for the selection bias affects the parameters.
Finally, we present and discuss our markup and marginal cost estimates.
The output elasticities are reported in Table III.43 The nice feature of the
translog is that unlike in a Cobb–Douglas production function, output elasticities can vary across firms (and across products within firms). We report both
the average and standard deviation of the elasticities across sectors, and the
final column reports the returns to scale. We note that a few sectors appear to
have low returns to scale, but these are driven by outliers; Table IV reports median output elasticities which are less influenced by outliers. Since the returns
to scale vary across firms, it is possible for many firms in a sector to have increasing returns to scale, while the estimate of the industry-average returns to
scale is close to 1. At the firm level, 68 percent of the sample exhibits increasing
returns to scale.
Columns 1–4 of Table V repeat the production function estimation without
implementing the correction for the unobserved input price variation discussed
in Section 3.2.2. The uncorrected procedure yields nonsensical estimates of the
production function. For example, the output elasticities and returns to scale
are sometimes negative, very low, or very high. These results are to be expected
given that we estimate a quantity-based production function using deflated input expenditures, that is, we relate physical output to input expenditures. It is
clear that failing to account for input price variation yields distorted estimates.
To understand the source of the distortion, consider the following concrete example from our data: in 1995, Ashnoor Textile Mills and Delight Handicrafts
43
The output elasticities for capital and labor are defined analogously to the materials elasticity
reported in footnote 40.
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TABLE III
AVERAGE OUTPUT ELASTICITIES, BY SECTORa

Sector

15 Food products and beverages

Observations in
Production Function
Returns to
Estimation
Labor Materials Capital
Scale
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

795

013
071
015
[017] [022] [014]

099
[028]

1581

011
082
008
[002] [004] [008]

101
[006]

470

019
078
003
[012] [010] [005]

100
[006]

1554

017
079
008
[008] [007] [006]

103
[008]

25 Rubber and plastic

705

015
069 −002
[039] [029] [035]

082
[089]

26 Nonmetallic mineral products

633

016
067 −004
[026] [012] [040]

079
[036]

27 Basic metals

949

014
077
001
[009] [011] [006]

091
[018]

28 Fabricated metal products

393

018
075
003
[004] [008] [017]

096
[017]

29 Machinery and equipment

702

020
076
018
[008] [005] [005]

113
[014]

31 Electrical machinery and communications

761

009
078 −006
[011] [011] [022]

081
[028]

34 Motor vehicles, trailers

386

025
063
011
[026] [020] [020]

100
[025]

17 Textiles, apparel
21 Paper and paper products
24 Chemicals

a Table reports the output elasticities from the production function. Column 1 reports the number of observations
for each production function estimation. Columns 2–4 report the average estimated output elasticity with respect to
each factor of production for the translog production function for all firms. Standard deviations (not standard errors)
of the output elasticities are reported in brackets. Column 5 reports the average returns to scale, which is the sum of
the preceding three columns.

Palace sold 71,910 and 67,000,000 carpets, respectively. Ashnoor, however, had
about three times higher input expenditures and three times higher revenues.
It is easiest to understand the implications of this example for the estimates using a Cobb–Douglas specification. A quantity production function estimation
that ignores input price variation would result in very large and negative output
elasticities (more input expenditures result in lower quantity for Ashnoor). In
the more general translog specification, it is impossible to sign this bias because
there are three inputs which interact in complicated ways with each other and
input prices, but it is clear that one needs to correct for input price variation
across firms. By introducing the input price control, we are effectively compar-
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TABLE IV
MEDIAN OUTPUT ELASTICITIES, BY SECTORa

Sector

Labor
(1)

Materials
(2)

Capital
(3)

Returns to
Scale
(4)

15 Food products and beverages
17 Textiles, apparel
21 Paper and paper products
24 Chemicals
25 Rubber and plastic
26 Nonmetallic mineral products
27 Basic metals
28 Fabricated metal products
29 Machinery and equipment
31 Electrical machinery and communications
34 Motor vehicles, trailers

0.12
0.11
0.18
0.16
0.21
0.18
0.14
0.17
0.17
0.10
0.23

0.75
0.82
0.79
0.79
0.75
0.69
0.78
0.75
0.75
0.80
0.64

0.20
0.09
0.03
0.06
0.04
0.04
0.02
0.02
0.16
0.01
0.10

1.09
1.02
0.98
1.02
1.03
0.88
0.96
0.94
1.08
0.91
0.97

a Table reports the median output elasticities from the production function. Columns 1–3 report the median estimated output elasticity with respect to each factor of production for the translog production function for all firms.
Column 4 reports the median returns to scale.

ing output quantities to input quantities, and the resulting output elasticities
then look reasonable.
The importance of the input price correction is not apparent in the earlier
literature, which traditionally estimates a Cobb–Douglas specification of the
form q + p = x̃β + ω̃ This specification relates deflated sales to deflated expenditures and implies that ω̃ = ω + p − w(·). That is, the unobserved productivity measure includes both (unobserved) output price p and (unobserved)
input prices w. If one does not control for either output or input price variation (the typical practice in this literature until recently), there is no apparent
problem, as the two price biases tend to work in opposite directions. To obtain some intuition for the combined impact of these biases on the estimation,
suppose that higher input prices were completely passed through to higher
output prices, so that p = w(·). In this case, ω̃ = ω, and a regression of revenues (q + p) on input expenditures x̃ would deliver unbiased estimates of the
coefficients β. De Loecker and Goldberg (2014) discussed the conditions under which this happens, which turn out to be highly restrictive.44 In the general
case, the output and input biases will not completely offset each other, but they
will still partially neutralize each other as higher input prices will generally be
partially passed through to higher output prices. This will lead to output elasticities that appear plausible without immediately calling for a correction. In
fact, when we estimate a firm-level revenue-based production function using
the standard approach, we obtain production function coefficients that look
44

See Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.4 in De Loecker and Goldberg (2014) for a discussion of this issue.
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Estimates Without Correcting for
Input Price Variation

Sector

15 Food products and beverages
17 Textiles, apparel
21 Paper and paper products
24 Chemicals
25 Rubber and plastic
26 Nonmetallic mineral products
27 Basic metals
28 Fabricated metal products
29 Machinery and equipment
31 Electrical machinery and communications
34 Motor vehicles, trailers

Estimates Without Correcting for
Sample Selection

Labor
(1)

Materials
(2)

Capital
(3)

Returns to
Scale
(4)

Labor
(5)

Materials
(6)

Capital
(7)

Returns to
Scale
(8)

003
−007
−013
038
−010
008
−018
−117
−072
−159
−023

075
070
023
069
030
064
111
−028
118
057
−039

082
−007
−019
−072
−015
081
−033
160
−050
−013
123

178
052
−023
026
021
150
069
028
−010
−047
044

0.22
0.11
0.17
0.16
0.17
0.12
0.12
0.15
0.16
0.10
0.20

0.63
0.83
0.77
0.79
0.75
0.71
0.80
0.74
0.76
0.84
0.70

014
009
003
004
−005
011
002
004
015
002
004

1.03
1.03
0.98
0.99
0.94
0.93
0.94
0.95
1.06
0.95
0.94

a Columns 1–4 report the median output elasticities from production function estimations that do not account for input price variation. Columns 5–8 reports the median output
elasticities from production function estimations that do not account for sample selection (transition from single-product to multi-product firms).
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TABLE V
OUTPUT ELASTICITIES, INPUT PRICE VARIATION, AND SAMPLE SELECTIONa
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similar to the previous literature (see Appendix E of the Supplemental Material (De Loecker, Goldberg, Khandelwal, and Pavcnik (2016))). Of course,
this does not mean that the two biases exactly cancel each other, so the final
estimates will generally still be biased. Moreover, estimation of the production
function using the revenue-based approach implies that one can only conduct
the analysis at the firm level. Such firm-level analysis would not allow one to
obtain marginal costs and markups at the product level and exploit productspecific variation in tariffs in order to identify the effects of the trade reforms.
Columns 5–8 of Table V present the median output elasticities from an estimation of the production function that does not include the sample selection
correction described in Section 3.2.3. The coefficients change slightly when the
selection correction is not implemented. The stability of the coefficient estimates with and without selection correction for the unbalanced panel suggests
that the use of the unbalanced panel of single-product firms (which includes
firms that are always single-product and firms that ultimately transition to a
multi-product status) likely alleviates most of the concerns about the selection
bias. This is consistent with the findings in Olley and Pakes (1996).
The markups are reported in Table VI. The mean and median markups are
2.70 and 1.34, respectively, but there is considerable variation across sectors
and across products and firms within sectors. Some firms report markups below 1 for individual products, but multi-product firms maximize profits across
products, so they may lose money on some products while being profitable on
others. To get a better sense of the plausibility of our estimates, we aggregate
TABLE VI
MARKUPS, BY SECTORa
Markups
Sector

Mean

Median

15 Food products and beverages
17 Textiles, apparel
21 Paper and paper products
24 Chemicals
25 Rubber and plastic
26 Nonmetallic mineral products
27 Basic metals
28 Fabricated metal products
29 Machinery and equipment
31 Electrical machinery and communications
34 Motor vehicles, trailers

1.78
1.57
1.22
2.25
4.52
4.57
2.54
3.70
2.48
5.66
4.64

1.15
1.33
1.21
1.36
1.37
2.27
1.20
1.36
1.34
1.43
1.39

Average

2.70

1.34

a Table displays the mean and median markup by sector for the sample 1989–2003.
The table trims observations with markups that are above and below the 3rd and 97th
percentiles within each sector.
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the product-level markups to the firm level using the share of sales as weights.
The firm-level markups are below 1 for only about 8 percent of the sample
and the median firm-level markup is 1.60. In fact, we find a strong positive
(and statistically significant) relationship between firm markups and reported
accounting profits, measured as operating profits divided by total sales (results
available upon request). Importantly, for our main results below, we rely on
changes in markups over time by exploiting variation within firm–product pairs
rather than variation in levels across firms.
The methodology provides measures of markups and marginal costs without
a priori assumptions on the returns to scale. The estimates show that many
firms are characterized by increasing returns to scale, so we expect to observe
an inverse relationship between a product’s marginal cost and quantity produced. Accordingly, another way to assess the plausibility of the measures is to
plot marginal costs against production quantities in Figure 1 (we de-mean each
variable by product–year fixed effects in order to facilitate comparisons across
firms). The figure shows indeed that marginal costs vary inversely with production quantities. The left panel of the figure shows that quantities and markups
are positively related, indicating that firms producing more output also enjoy
higher markups (due to their lower marginal costs).
We also examine how markups and marginal costs vary across products
within a firm. Our analysis here is guided by the recent literature on multi-

FIGURE 1.—Markups, marginal costs and quantities. Variables de-meaned by product.
Markups, cost and quantity outliers are trimmed below and above 3rd and 97th percentiles.
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product firms. Our correlations are remarkably consistent with the predictions
of this literature, especially with those of Eckel and Neary (2010) and the multiproduct firm extension of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) developed by Mayer,
Melitz, and Ottaviano (2014). A key assumption in these models is that multiproduct firms each have a “core competency.” The core product has the lowest (within a firm) marginal cost. For the other products, marginal costs rise
with a product’s distance from the core competency. Mayer, Melitz, and Ottaviano (2014) assumed a linear demand system which implies that firms have
nonconstant markups across products. Furthermore, firms have their highest
markups on their “core” products, with markups declining as they move away
from their main product. Figure 2 provides evidence supporting these implications. It plots the de-meaned markups and marginal costs against the sales
share of the product within each firm (markups and marginal costs are demeaned by product–year and firm–year fixed effects in order to make these
variables comparable across products within firms). Marginal costs rise as a
firm moves away from its core competency, while the markups fall. In other
words, the firm’s most profitable product (excluding any product-specific fixed
costs) is its core product. Despite not imposing any assumptions on the market
structure and demand system in our estimation, these correlations are remarkably consistent with the predictions from the multi-product firm literature.

FIGURE 2.—Markups, costs and product sales share. Markups and marginal costs are
de-meaned by product–year and firm–year FEs. Markup and marginal cost outliers are trimmed
below and above 3rd and 97th percentiles.
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4.2. Pass-Through
Foreshadowing the results in the next subsection, we also find evidence of
imperfect pass-through of costs on prices because of variable markups. This
subsection explains how we estimate pass-through.
Consider the identity that decomposes the (log) price of a firm f producing
product j into its two subcomponents: (log) marginal cost, ln mcfjt , and (log)
markup, ln μfjt :
(33)

ln Pfjt = ln mcfjt + ln μfjt 

This identity can also be written as
(34)

ln Pfjt = ln μfj + ln mcfjt + (ln μfjt − ln μfj )

where ln μfj is the (time-invariant) average (log) markup for this particular
firm–product pair and (ln μfjt − ln μfj ) is the deviation of the markup from
its average. If markups are constant, then the last term becomes zero. This is
the case of complete pass-through: a proportional change in marginal cost is
passed entirely to prices. If markups are variable, then marginal costs are correlated with the term in parentheses and pass-through is incomplete. For example, if the price elasticity of demand is increasing in price, then an increase
in marginal cost (which will tend to raise the price) will lead to an increase
in the price elasticity of demand and a decrease in the markup. In this case,
the marginal cost is negatively correlated with the (variable) markup and the
pass-through of a marginal cost change onto price is below 1. This correlation between marginal costs and markups is not an econometric issue since the
equation above is an identity. Rather, it is a correlation dictated by economic
theory: any model that implies variable markups will also imply a correlation
between marginal cost and markup and result in incomplete pass-through.
To understand the implications of variable markups and incomplete passthrough in our setting, first consider the hypothetical case where marginal cost
can be measured exactly. Suppose we run the following pass-through regression:
(35)

ln Pfjt = afj + ζ ln mcfjt + εfjt 

where afj is a firm–product fixed effect. In this setup, the error term εfjt has
a structural interpretation. It reflects the deviation of the actual markup in
period t from the average (i.e., it corresponds to (ln μfjt − ln μfj )).
If markups are constant, then we would expect to find that ζ = 1 and εfjt = 0
(i.e., an exact fit). The firm–product fixed effect afj would accurately measure
the constant markup and the coefficient ζ would measure the pass-through of
marginal cost to price which would be complete (ζ = 1). The deviation of the
actual markup from the average, εfjt , would be zero if markups were constant.
Of course, in reality we would never get an exact fit of the regression line.
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But as long as εfjt captures random variation in price (due, e.g., to recording
errors) that is orthogonal to the marginal cost, we would estimate complete
pass-through.
If markups are variable, then the error term εfjt will be correlated with the
marginal cost ln mcfjt .45 We again emphasize that this correlation is dictated by
theory and not by econometrics. If the price elasticity facing the firm is increasing in price, then a marginal cost increase will lead to a price increase, which
will raise the price elasticity and lower the markup. Hence, εfjt and ln mcfjt
will be negatively correlated and the pass-through coefficient ζ will be below 1.
This is the case of incomplete pass-through.
When observing marginal cost, the coefficient ζ reflects markup variability
and pass-through. There would be no need to instrument for marginal costs.
In fact, instrumenting marginal costs is conceptually incorrect because the correlation between marginal costs and the structural error of the regression (i.e.,
the markup) is precisely what the coefficient ζ is supposed to capture. However, in our application (and almost every other empirical study), we only observe an estimate of marginal cost, ln mcfjt = ln mcfjt + σfjt . The pass-through
regression becomes
(36)

ln Pfjt = afj + ζ ln mcfjt + (εfjt − ζσfjt ) = afj + ζ ln mcfjt + ufjt 

Measurement error results in a downward bias in the pass-through coefficient ζ, leading us to conclude, potentially erroneously, that pass-through is
incomplete. We therefore require instruments to address measurement error
in marginal costs. It is important to note that, in this setting, instruments must
be uncorrelated with the measurement error, σfjt . However, we do not require
that they are uncorrelated with the part of the error term that reflects the deviation in markup, εfjt . Indeed, such a condition would be inconsistent with the
exercise which is precisely to measure the correlation between marginal cost
and markup, that is, the correlation between mcfjt and εfjt .
We instrument for marginal cost in equation (36) with input tariffs and
lagged marginal cost. Both variables are certainly correlated with marginal
cost. The former should be uncorrelated with the measurement error in our
marginal cost estimate, but input tariffs do not vary at the firm level. The advantage of lagged marginal cost is that it varies at the firm–product–year level.
Although lagged marginal costs contain measurement error, we have no reason
to expect this measurement error to be serially correlated.
Table VII presents the pass-through results from estimating (36).46 OLS results are reported in Column 1, and the coefficient is 0.337. Column 2 instru45
Variable markups can be generated in many different ways through various combinations of
market structure, firm behavior, and demand function. See Goldberg and Hellerstein (2013) for
a discussion.
46
As noted in Section 3.4, we report bootstrap standard errors.
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TABLE VII
PASS-THROUGH OF COSTS TO PRICESa
ln Pfjt

ln mcfjt
Observations
Within R-squared
Firm–product FEs
Instruments
First-stage F-test

(1)

(2)

(3)

0337∗∗∗
0041

0305∗∗∗
0084

0406†
0247

21,246
0.27
yes
–
–

16,012
0.19
yes
yes
98

12,334
0.09
yes
yes
5

a The dependent variable is (log) price. Column 1 is an OLS regression
on log marginal costs. Column 2 instruments marginal costs with input tariffs and lag marginal costs. Column 3 instruments marginal costs with input
tariffs and two-period lag marginal costs. The regressions exclude outliers in
the top and bottom 3rd percent of the markup distribution. All regressions
include firm–product fixed effects. The regressions use data from 1989–1997.
The standard errors are bootstrapped and are clustered at the firm level. Significance: † 10.1 percent, ∗ 10 percent, ∗∗ 5 percent, ∗∗∗ 1 percent.

ments marginal costs with both lagged marginal cost and input tariffs. The coefficient becomes 0.305, but is not statistically different from the OLS estimate.
In case one is concerned about first-order serial correlation in measurement
error, Column 3 uses input tariffs and two-period lagged marginal cost as the
instruments, and the IV estimate is now 0.405 and significant at the 10.1 percent level. Thus, the results seem robust to the use of alternative instruments
and consistently point to low pass-through. This imperfect pass-through means
that shocks to marginal costs, for example, shocks from trade liberalization, do
not lead to proportional changes in factory-gate prices because of changes in
markups. We examine this markup adjustment in detail in the subsequent section.
4.3. Prices, Markups, and Trade Liberalization
We now examine how prices, markups, and marginal costs adjusted as India liberalized its economy. As discussed in Section 2, we restrict the analysis
to 1989–1997 since tariff movements after this period appear correlated with
industry characteristics.
We begin by plotting the distribution of raw prices in 1989 and 1997 in Figure 3. Here, we include only firm–product pairs that are present in both years,
and we compare the prices over time by regressing them on firm–product pair
fixed effects plotting the residuals. As before, we remove outliers in the bottom and top third percentiles. This comparison of the same firm–product pairs
over time exploits the same variation as our regression analysis below. The

PRICES, MARKUPS, AND TRADE REFORM

489

FIGURE 3.—Distribution of prices in 1989 and 1997. Sample only includes firm–product pairs
present in 1989 and 1997. Outliers above and below the 3rd and 97th percentiles are trimmed.

figure shows that the distribution of (real) prices did not change much between 1989 and 1997. This might at first be a surprising result given the nature of India’s economic reforms during this period that were designed to reduce entry barriers and increase competition in the manufacturing sector. As
a first pass, the figure suggests that prices did not move much despite the reforms.
Of course, the figure includes only firm–product pairs that are present at the
beginning and end of the sample, and summarizes aggregate trends, thereby
not controlling for sector-specific factors that could influence prices beyond
the trade reforms. We use the entire sample and control for macroeconomic
trends in the following specification:47
(37)
47

output

pfjt = λfj + λst + λ1 τit

+ ηfjt 

One could try to capture the net impact of tariff reforms using the effective rate of protection (ERP) measure proposed by Corden (1966). However, this measure is derived in a setting
with perfect competition and infinite export-demand and import-supply elasticities which imply
perfect pass-through. As we show below, these assumptions are not satisfied in our setting, so that
the concept of the “effective rate of protection” is not well defined in our case. The ERP has two
further limitations in our context. The first is that the ERP combines the decline in output and
input tariffs which blurs the two thought experiments of reducing the marginal cost and changing
the residual demand facing firms. The second limitation is that a specification with ERP on the
right-hand side, by construction, restricts the marginal effect of a unit decline in output tariff on
the outcome of interest to be the same as the marginal effect of a unit increase in an input tariff.
The specifications we employ below are more flexible. We nevertheless report results using the
ERP in Table A.II in the Supplemental Material. The results suggest that prices decline with a
decline in ERP, but we do not find statistically significant effects on marginal costs and markups.
As noted above, it is not clear how to interpret these results given that the ERP is conceptually
wrong in our context.
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TABLE VIII
PRICES AND OUTPUT TARIFFS, ANNUAL REGRESSIONSa
ln Pfjt

(1)
output

(2)

τit

0136∗∗
0056

0167∗∗∗
0054

Within R-squared
Observations
Firm–product FEs
Year FEs
Sector–year FEs

0.00
21,246
yes
yes
no

0.02
21,246
yes
no
yes

Overall impact of trade liberalization

−84∗∗
3.4

−104∗∗∗
3.3

a The dependent variable is a firm–product’s (log) price. Column 1 includes year
fixed effects and Column 2 includes sector–year fixed effects. The regressions exclude
outliers in the top and bottom 3rd percent of the markup distribution. All regressions
include firm–product fixed effects and use data from 1989–1997. Standard errors are
clustered at the industry level. The final row uses the average 62% decline in output tariffs from 1989–1997 to compute the mean and standard error of the impact
of trade liberalization on prices. That is, for each column the mean impact is equal to
the −062 × 100 × {coefficient on output tariffs}. Significance: ∗ 10 percent, ∗∗ 5 percent,
∗∗∗ 1 percent.

We exploit variation in prices and output tariffs within a firm–product over
time through the firm–product fixed effects (λfj ) and control for macroeconomic fluctuations through sector–year fixed effects λst . Since the trade policy measure varies at the industry level, we cluster our standard errors at this
level.48 We report the price regression with just year fixed effects in Column 1
of Table VIII. The coefficient on the output tariff is positive, implying that a
10 percentage point decline is associated with a small—1.36 percent—decline
in prices.49 Between 1989 and 1997, output tariffs fall, on average, by 62 percentage points; this results in a precisely estimated average price decline of 8.4
percent (= 62 × 0136). This is a small effect of the trade reform on prices and
it is consistent with the raw distributions plotted in Figure 3. The basic message
remains the same if we control more flexibly for trends with sector–year fixed
effects in Column 2. The results imply that the average decline in output tariffs
led to a 10.4 (= 62 × 0167) percent relative drop in prices.
These results show that although the trade liberalization led to lower factorygate prices, the decline is more modest than we would have expected given the
magnitude of the tariff declines. Since earlier studies (Goldberg et al. (2010a),
48
Recall from Section 2 that tariffs vary at a four-digit level, while sector is defined as a twodigit industry.
49
Our result is consistent with Topalova (2010) who found that a 10 percentage point decline
in output tariffs results in a 0.96 percent decline in wholesale prices in India during this period.
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Topalova and Khandelwal (2011)) have emphasized the importance of declines
in input tariffs in shaping firm performance, we separate the effects of output
tariffs and input tariffs on prices. Output tariff liberalization reflects primarily
an increase in competition, while the input tariff liberalization should provide
access to lower cost (and more variety of) inputs. We run the analog of the
regression in (37), but separately include input and output tariffs:
(38)

output

pfjt = λfj + λst + λ1 τit

input

+ λ2 τit

+ ηfjt 

The results are shown in Column 1 of Table IX.50 There are two interesting
findings that are important for understanding how trade affects prices in this
liberalization episode. First, there is a positive and statistically significant coefficient on output tariffs. This result is consistent with the common intuition
that increases in competitive pressures through lower output tariffs will lead to
price declines. The effect is traditionally attributed to reductions in markups
TABLE IX
PRICES, COSTS, AND MARKUPS AND TARIFFSa
ln Pfjt

ln mcfjt

ln μfjt

(1)

(2)

(3)

0109
0076

output

0156∗∗∗
0059

0047
0084

τit

input

0352
0302

1160∗∗
0557

Within R-squared
Observations
Firm–product FEs
Sector–year FEs

0.02
21,246
yes
yes

0.01
21,246
yes
yes

0.01
21,246
yes
yes

Overall impact of trade liberalization

−181∗∗
7.4

−307∗∗
13.4

12.6
11.9

τit

−0807‡
0510

a The dependent variable is noted in the columns. The sum of the coefficients from the markup and marginal
costs regression equals their respective coefficient in the price regression. The regressions exclude outliers in the
top and bottom 3rd percent of the markup distribution, and include firm–product fixed effects and sector–year fixed
effects. The final row uses the average 62% and 24% declines in output and input tariffs from 1989–1997, respectively, to compute the mean and standard error of the impact of trade liberalization on each performance measure.
That is, for each column the mean impact is equal to the −062 × 100 × {coefficient on output tariff} ± 024 × 100 ×
{coefficient on input tariff}. The regressions use data from 1989–1997. The table reports the bootstrapped standard
errors that are clustered at the industry level. Significance: ‡ 11.3 percent, ∗ 10 percent, ∗∗ 5 percent, ∗∗∗ 1 percent.

50

The regressions exclude outliers in the top and bottom third percent of the markup distribution. We trim to ensure that the results are not driven by outliers. Nevertheless, the results
are robust (e.g., magnitudes change slightly but statistical significance is unaffected) to alternative trims (e.g., the top and bottom first) and to not trimming at all (results are available upon
request).
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and/or reductions in X-inefficiencies within the firm. The point estimates imply that a 10 percentage point decline in output tariffs results in a 1.56 percent
decline in prices. On the other hand, the coefficient on input tariffs is noisy.
Holding input tariffs fixed and reducing output tariffs, we would observe a
precisely estimated decline in prices. Overall, average output tariffs and input
tariffs fall by 62 and 24 percentage points, respectively, and using the point estimates in Column 1, this implies that prices fall, on average, by 18.1 percent
(a decline that is statistically significant).
We use the estimates of markups and costs to examine the mechanisms behind these moderate changes in factory-gate prices. We begin by plotting the
distribution of markups and costs in Figure 4. Like Figure 3, this figure considers only firm–product pairs that appear in both 1989 and 1997. The figure
indicates that between 1989 and 1997, the marginal cost distribution shifted
left, indicating an efficiency gain. However, this marginal cost decline is offset by a corresponding rightward shift in the markup distribution. Since (log)
marginal costs and (log) markups exactly sum to (log) prices, the net effect results in little changes to prices. Hence, the raw data point towards imperfect
pass-through of cost declines to prices. As before, these patterns are only suggestive and presented only for illustrative purposes, given that the figures do
not condition on the policy and other changes that took place over this period.
We re-run specification (38) using marginal costs and markups as the dependent variables to formally analyze these relationships. Since prices decompose
exactly to the sum of marginal costs and markups, the coefficients in Columns
2 and 3 sum to their respective coefficients in Column 1 in Table IX. We first focus on the marginal cost regressions reported in Column 2. The coefficient on
output tariffs is statistically insignificant, suggesting that marginal costs are insensitive to output tariff liberalization. However, the coefficient on input tariffs
is both positive and large in magnitude. This is strong evidence that improved
access to cheaper and more variety of imported inputs results in large cost declines. The final row of Table IX reports the average effect on marginal costs
using the average declines in input and output tariffs. On average, marginal
costs fell 30.7 percent.51
This magnitude of the marginal costs decline is sizable and would translate to
larger price declines if markups were constant. However, Figure 4 suggests that
markups rose during this period, and in Column 3 of Table IX, we directly examine how input and output tariffs affected markups. The coefficient on input
tariffs is large and negative, implying that input tariff liberalization resulted in
51
This decline is sizable, but consistent with earlier work documenting the effects of input
tariffs on input prices and input varieties, with the latter further lowering the exact price index for
intermediate inputs in India. Specifically, calculations from Goldberg et al. (2010a) suggest that
prices of imported intermediaries fell by 21 percent as a result of the tariff reductions, while new
varieties of intermediate inputs increased by 8.9 percent. These estimates cannot be converted
to estimates of marginal cost declines without further structure, but they suggest large effects of
tariff reductions on firms’ costs.
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FIGURE 4.—Distribution of marginal costs and markups in 1989 and 1997. Sample only includes firm–product pairs present in 1989 and 1997. Outliers above and below the 3rd and 97th
percentiles are trimmed.

higher markups. The results indicate that firms offset the beneficial cost reductions from improved access to imported inputs by raising markups. The overall
effect, taking into account the average declines in input and output tariffs between 1989 and 1997, is that markups, on average, increased by 12.6 percent.
This increase offsets almost half of the average decline in marginal costs, and
as a result, the overall effect of the trade reform on prices is moderated.52
Although tempting, it is misleading to draw conclusions about the procompetitive effects of the trade reform from the markup regressions in Column 3 of Table IX. The reason is that one needs to control for the impacts of
52
These results are robust to controlling India’s de-licensing policy reform; see Table A.I in the
Supplemental Material.
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the output tariff liberalization on marginal costs in order to isolate the procompetitive effects. For example, if output tariffs affect costs through changes
in X-inefficiencies, firms may adjust markups in response to these cost changes.
The simultaneous effects that tariffs have on both costs and markups make it
difficult to identify pro-competitive effects of the reform based on the specification in Column 3.
To isolate the pro-competitive effects, we need to control for simultaneous shocks to marginal costs. We do this by re-running the markup regression while controlling flexibly for marginal costs. Conditioning on marginal
costs, the output tariff coefficient isolates the direct pro-competitive effect of
the trade liberalization on markups. We report the results in Table X.53 The
coefficient on output tariffs in Column 1 is positive and significant; this provides direct evidence that output tariff liberalization exerted pro-competitive
pressure on markups. The way to interpret the results in Column 1 is to consider the markups of two products in different industries. Conditional on any
(potentially differential) impact of the trade reforms on their respective costs,
TABLE X
PRO-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF OUTPUT TARIFFSa
ln μfjt

output

τit

output

τit

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0143∗∗∗
0050

0150∗∗
0062

0129∗∗
0052

0149∗∗
0062

0314∗∗
0134

0028
0150

0.59
21,246
yes
yes
yes
no
–

0.65
16,012
yes
yes
yes
yes
8.6

× Topfp

Within R-squared
Observations
Second-order polynomial of marginal cost
Firm–product FEs
Sector–year FEs
Instruments
First-stage F-test

0.59
21,246
yes
yes
yes
no
–

0.65
16,012
yes
yes
yes
yes
8.6

a The dependent variable is (log) markup. All regressions include firm–product fixed effects, sector–year fixed
effects and a second-order polynomial of marginal costs (these coefficients are suppressed and available upon request). Columns 2 and 4 instrument the second-order polynomial of marginal costs with second-order polynomial of
lag marginal costs and input tariffs. Columns 3 interacts output tariffs and the second-order marginal cost polynomial
with an indicator if a firm–product observation was in the top 10 percent of its sector’s markup distribution when it first
appears in the sample. The regressions exclude outliers in the top and bottom 3rd percent of the markup distribution.
The table reports the bootstrapped standard errors that are clustered at the industry level. Significance: ∗ 10 percent,
∗∗ 5 percent, ∗∗∗ 1 percent.

53

To control for marginal costs as flexibly as possible, we use a second-order polynomial for
marginal costs and suppress these coefficients in Table X. We find very similar results if we simply
include marginal costs as the only control (results are available upon request).
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the product in the industry that experiences a 10 percentage point larger decline in output tariffs will have a 1.43 percent relative decline in markups.54
Column 2 instruments marginal costs to account for measurement error (see
discussion in Section 4.2) with input tariffs and a second-order polynomial in
lagged marginal costs, and the coefficient increases slightly and remains statistically significant. In sum, our analysis demonstrates that although India’s
trade reform led to large cost reductions, firms responded by raising markups.
Once we control for these cost effects, output tariff reductions do have procompetitive effects by putting downward pressure on markups.
The pro-competitive effects might differ across products. For example, output tariffs may exert more pressure on products with high markups prior to the
reform. We explore this heterogeneity by creating a time-invariant indicator
for firm–product pairs in the top decile of their industry’s markup distribution
in the first year that a product-pair is observed in the data. We interact output tariffs with this indicator to allow for differential effects of output tariffs
on markups for these high markup products. The results are reported in Column 3 of Table X. The table shows a very strong effect of output tariffs on these
high markup products: a 10 percentage point decline in output tariffs leads to
a 1.29 percent fall in markups for products initially below the 90th percentile
in the markup distribution. For high markup products, the same policy reform
results in an additional 3.14 percent decline in markups. In short, once we control for the incomplete pass-through of costs, output tariffs reduce markups
and these reductions are substantially more pronounced on products with initially high markups. If we instrument marginal costs, the coefficient on output
tariffs increases even further, while the coefficient on the interaction remains
positive, but is not statistically significant.
4.4. Interpretation of Results: Variable Markups and Incomplete Pass-Through
Our results call for a nuanced evaluation of the effects of the Indian trade
liberalization on markups. While we do find evidence that the tariff reductions
have pro-competitive effects, especially at the right tail of the markup distribution, our results suggest that the most significant effect of the reforms is to
reduce costs to producers. Due to variable markups, cost reductions are not
passed through completely to consumers.
This last finding raises the question of why prices do not fully respond to
cost reductions. Our results here relate to a voluminous literature on price
rigidities and incomplete pass-through in macroeconomics and international
macroeconomics. While this literature has focused primarily on exchange rate
pass-through, its findings are equally relevant to tariff reductions given that ex54
In unreported results, we include input tariffs in the regression. As discussed earlier, input
tariffs should affect markups only through the imperfect transmission of their impact on costs
through improved access to imported inputs. Once we control for marginal costs, input tariffs
should have no effect on markups and that is what we find.
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change rate and tariff changes have similar effects on firm profits. Structural
approaches within this literature explain incomplete pass-through through a
combination of demand side and market structure assumptions. As discussed
in Section 4.2, there is a large class of potential models (i.e., combinations of
demand side and market structure assumptions) that can generate this phenomenon. Incomplete pass-through requires the demand elasticity perceived
by the firm to be rising in price, so any model that delivers a demand elasticity increasing in price will also deliver incomplete pass-through. For example, this pattern can be generated in a setting with a linear consumer demand
and monopolistic competition as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). Alternatively,
one could assume CES preferences and Cournot (e.g., Atkeson and Burstein
(2008)), or nested logit and Bertrand (e.g., Goldberg (1995) or Goldberg and
Verboven (2005)), or random coefficients and Bertrand (e.g., Goldberg and
Hellerstein (2013) or Nakamura and Zerom (2010)). Which assumptions are
appropriate depends on the industry under investigation. Against this background, the advantage of our approach is precisely the fact that it establishes
the existence of incomplete pass-through and explores its implications for trade
policy without committing to a particular structure. Such structure may be defensible in the context of Industrial Organization case studies which rely on a
careful study of the industry under consideration and its institutional setting to
inform their assumptions. But it is less defensible in the context of an analysis
of the entire Indian manufacturing sector that includes many heterogeneous
industries, each likely characterized by different demand and market conditions. Our study demonstrates that variable markups generate incomplete cost
pass-through in many different sectors, but it cannot answer the question of
which fundamentals in each case generate variable markups. To answer this
last question, one would need to impose more structure along the lines of the
aforementioned studies, yet doing so would undermine the fundamental rationale and advantage of our approach.
Our results suggest that the trade reforms benefited producers relatively
more than consumers, at least in the short run. However, this does not necessarily imply that the reform lowered consumer welfare. There are two channels
through which consumers may have benefited from the trade reforms, despite
the fact that prices did not decrease significantly. First, it is possible that the
quality of existing products improved. The finding that prices did not decline in
full proportion to the decline in trade barriers is consistent with this possibility. Note, however, that quality upgrading is costly. In the absence of changes in
input prices and productivity due to the trade liberalization, we would expect
quality upgrading to be associated with an increase in marginal costs, while our
study documents a decrease in marginal costs. However, it is possible that in
the absence of quality upgrading, marginal costs would have fallen even further. Our results in Table IX capture the composite effect of all these factors
(lower input prices, productivity increases, and potential quality changes) on
marginal costs. Moreover, the estimates are net of trends, captured by sector–
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year fixed effects, so we cannot rule out absolute increases in quality. Similarly, the increase in markups is consistent with, but cannot be attributed exclusively to, quality upgrading. Without variable markups, a marginal cost change
caused by quality changes would have been reflected in proportional changes
to prices. However, Table VII shows that the pass-through of marginal cost
changes on prices is incomplete; this is direct evidence that markups changed
conditional on marginal cost changes. A model with only quality upgrading
(and no incomplete pass-through) would not generate such a finding. In general, our results are consistent with quality upgrading in response to the trade
reform, but cannot be explained by quality upgrading alone.
The second channel through which trade liberalization may have benefited
consumers is through long-term dynamic gains. Though such gains are difficult
to pin down empirically, they are potentially important. There is an active literature studying the relationship between competition, firm profitability, and
innovation (e.g., see Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, and Howitt (2005)). In
Goldberg et al. (2010a), we showed that firms introduced many new products—
accounting for about a quarter of output growth—during this period. If the
cost reductions (and associated markup increases) induced by the trade reform spurred this product growth, the long-run benefits to consumers are potentially substantially larger. We also observe a positive correlation between
changes in firm markups and product introductions (results available upon request).55 This suggests that firms used the input tariff reductions and associated
profit increases to finance the development of new products, implying potential long-term gains to consumers. A complete analysis of this mechanism and
the impact on welfare lies beyond the scope of this current paper.
5. CONCLUSION
This paper examines the adjustment of prices, markups, and marginal costs
in response to trade liberalization. We take advantage of detailed price and
quantity information to estimate markups from quantity-based production
functions. Our approach does not require any assumptions on the market
structure or demand curves that firms face. This feature of our approach is
important in our context since we want to analyze how markups adjust to trade
reforms without imposing ex ante restrictions on their behavior. An added advantage of our approach is that since we observe firm-level prices in the data,
we can directly compute firms’ marginal costs once we have estimates of the
markups.
Estimating quantity-based production functions for a broad range of differentiated products introduces new methodological issues that we must confront.
We propose an identification strategy based on estimating production functions on single-product firms. The advantage of this approach is that we do
55
These findings are consistent with Peters (2012), who developed a model with imperfect
competition that generates heterogeneous markups which determine innovation incentives.
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not need to take a stand on how inputs are allocated across products within
multi-product firms. We also demonstrate how to correct for a bias that arises
when researchers do not observe input price variation across firms, an issue
that becomes particularly important when estimating quantity-based production functions.
The large variation in markups suggests that trade models that assume constant markups may be missing an important channel when quantifying the gains
from trade. Furthermore, our results highlight the importance of analyzing the
effects of both output and input tariff liberalization. We observe large declines
in marginal costs, particularly due to input tariff liberalization. However, prices
do not fall by as much. This imperfect pass-through occurs because firms offset
the cost declines by raising markups. Conditional on marginal costs, we find
pro-competitive effects of output tariffs on markups. Our analysis is based on
data representative of larger firms, so our results are representative of these
larger firms. Our results suggest that trade liberalization can have large, yet
nuanced, effects on marginal costs and markups. Understanding the welfare
consequences of these results using models with variable markups is an important topic for future research.
Our results have broader implications for thinking about the trade and
productivity across firms in developing countries. The methodology produces
quantity-based productivity measures that can be compared with revenuebased productivity measures. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) discussed how these
measures can inform us about distortions and the magnitude of misallocation
within an economy. Importantly, our methodology can deliver quantity-based
productivity measures purged of substantial variation in markups across firms,
which potentially improves upon our understanding of the role of misallocation in generating productivity dispersion. We leave the analysis of the role
of misallocation on the distribution of these performance measures for future
research.
APPENDIX A: A FORMAL MODEL OF INPUT PRICE VARIATION
This appendix provides a formal economic model that rationalizes the use
of a flexible polynomial in output price, market share, and product dummies
to control for input prices. The model is a more general version of the models
considered in Kremer (1993) and Verhoogen (2008).
We proceed in the following steps. We first show that under the assumptions of the model, the quality of every input is an increasing function of output
quality. Next, we show that this implies that the price of every input will be an
increasing function of output quality. In the final step, we show that output
quality can be expressed as a flexible function of output price, market share,
and a set of product dummies. Having established a monotone relationship between input prices and output quality, this implies that the price of every input
can also be expressed as a function of the above variables.
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A.1. Production Function for Output Quality
Let vj indicate quality of product j and ψi indicate the quality of input i used
to produce product j.56 The production function for output quality is given by
(A.1)

vj =

n

[ψi ]κi ωj

with



κi < 1

i=1

For example, with three inputs, the above production function takes the form
κ

κ

κ

vj = ψKK ψLL ψMM ωj 
This function belongs to the class of “O-Ring” production functions discussed in Kremer (1993) and Verhoogen (2008). The particular (multiplica∂vj
>0
tive) functional form is not important; the important feature is that ∂ψi ∂ψ
k
∀i k and i = k. This cross-derivative implies complementarity in the quality of
inputs. A direct consequence is that higher output quality requires high quality
of all inputs (e.g., high-quality material inputs are used by high-skill workers
operating high-end machinery). The production function for quality can vary
across industries, but we assume that all firms producing in the same industry
face the same quality production function.
In addition to the production function for quality, we assume that higher
quality inputs are associated with higher input prices. Let W i denote the sectoral average of the price of input i (e.g., sectoral wage) and Wi (ψi ) the price
of a specific quality ψ of input i. Then,
(A.2)

Wi (ψi ) − W i = zi ψi

and

zi > 0

In our framework that postulates perfectly competitive input markets, this
assumption is tantamount to assuming that input markets are characterized
by vertical differentiation only. So while high quality inputs are expensive, all
firms pay the same input prices conditional on input quality.
A.2. Demand
The indirect utility Vnj that consumer n derives from consuming one unit of
product j can be written in general form as
(A.3)

Vnj = θn vj − αpj + εnj 

where pj is output price, θn denotes the willingness to pay for quality, and
εnj denotes an idiosyncratic preference shock. This specification is general and
56

Here, the subscript j denotes a particular product produced by a firm.
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encompasses the demand models commonly used in the literature. In its most
general formulation, the specification above corresponds to the random coefficients model. In models of pure vertical differentiation, the utility will be given
by the above expression with εnj = 0. A simple logit sets θn = θ = 1 (i.e., no
observable consumer heterogeneity) and εnj is assumed to follow the extreme
value distribution. In the nested logit, θn = θ = 1 and εnj follows the generalized extreme value distribution. Following the Industrial Organization literature, it is convenient to define the mean utility δj of product j as δj = vj − αpj .
The output quality vj is typically modeled as a function of observable and
unobservable product characteristics. For example, in Berry’s (1994) notation
with Xj denoting observable product characteristics, ξj denoting unobservable
quality, and a specification of mean utility that is linear in characteristics, output quality is given by vj = Xj β + ξj .
We now show how to control for quality variation across firms using observable characteristics using the specification in (A.3). Berry (1994) showed that
the actual market share of a product (msj ) is a function of product characteristics and output price:
(A.4)

msj = sj (δ σ ) = sj (v p ϑ)

where σ denotes a vector of density parameters of consumer characteristics
and ϑ denotes a parameter vector. While the exact functional form is determined by choice of a particular demand structure, the general insight is that
market shares are a function of product characteristics (i.e., quality) and prices.
Berry (1994) showed that equation (A.4) can be inverted to obtain the mean
utilities δ as a function of the observed market shares and the density parameters to be estimated.57 With the δ’s in hand, one can obtain quality as a function
of output price and the mean utility. This insight was exploited by Khandelwal
(2010), who used a nested logit model to express quality as a function of output price and conditional and unconditional market shares. In a simple logit
model, quality is a function of only output prices and unconditional market
shares. Here, we use a general formulation that specifies quality as a function
of output price, a vector of (conditional and unconditional) market shares, and
a set of product dummies:
(A.5)

vj = υ(pj  msj  D)

The product dummies are used in lieu of product characteristics (which are not
available in our data) and can accommodate more general demand specifications such as the nested logit and even the random coefficients model in cases
where it is reasonable to assume that product characteristics do not change
from year to year.
57
In the random coefficients model, the δ’s are solved numerically. In simpler models, one can
solve for the mean utilities analytically.
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A.3. The Firm’s Maximization Problem
Without loss of generality, we assume that firms use prices and quality as
strategic variables to maximize profits. Conditional on exogenous (to the firm)
input prices that are determined in competitive input markets, firms choose
input qualities. These choices determine the output quality according to the
quality production function in (A.1). Let mcj denote the marginal cost of producing a product j of quality vj . The marginal cost can be written as a function
of quantity produced qj , quality vj , a parameter vector γ, and productivity ωj ,
mcj (qj  vj  γ ωj ).
The profit function for a firm producing product j is
(A.6)




πj = N · sj p − mcj qj  vj (ψ ωj ) γ ωj 

where N denotes the market size (number of potential consumers). Output
quality vj is now explicitly written as a function of a vector of input qualities ψ
and productivity ωj using the production function for quality in (A.1).
The first-order condition with respect to price is
(A.7)

pj = mcj (qj  vj  γ ωj ) +

sj

|∂sj /∂pj |

The term sj /|∂sj /∂pj | represents the markup, and as shown in Berry (1994,
p. 254), it equals α1 [sj /(∂sj /∂δj )].
The first-order condition with respect to the quality of each input i, ψi , is
(A.8)

(pj − mcj ) ·

∂mcj
∂sj
− sj
= 0
∂ψi
∂ψi

From the first-order condition with respect to price, we have
(A.9)

(pj − mcj ) =

sj
1 sj
=

|∂sj /∂pj | α ∂sj /∂δj

Substituting this latter expression for the markup into the first-order condition
for input quality, we obtain
(A.10)

sj

 ∂sj
∂mcj
1
− sj
=0
1/(∂sj /∂δj )
α
∂ψi
∂ψi

or
(A.11)



 ∂sj ∂vj
∂mcj
1
=

1/(∂sj /∂δj )
α
∂vj ∂ψi
∂ψi
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From δj = vj − αpj follows that
simplifies to
(A.12)

∂sj
∂vj

=

∂sj
∂δj

, and the above first-order condition

∂mcj
1 ∂vj
=

α ∂ψi
∂ψi

Using the production function for quality to obtain the derivative
stituting into (A.12), we obtain


∂mcj
1
(A.13) ψi = κi vj 1/
∀i
α
∂ψi

∂vj
∂ψi

and sub-

This expression is similar to the one derived in Verhoogen (2008), but with
two differences. First, as we have shown above, the above expression can be
derived from a very general demand system and market structure. Second, we
did not assume a Leontief production technology. The last feature of the model
complicates the analysis slightly. With a Leontief production technology, the
∂mc
derivative ∂ψij is constant, and it will be positive given the assumption that
higher quality inputs demand higher prices. However, with more general production technologies, this derivative will itself depend on quality. We therefore
need to show explicitly that ψi is an increasing function of vj . The latter can be
established using the second-order conditions associated with profit maximization:
(A.14)

∂2 mcj
1 ∂vj 1
1
1
κi
− κi vj
−
< 0
α ∂ψi ψi α
(ψi )2
∂ψ2i
vj
1
∂2 mcj
1 2 vj
κi
− κi
−
< 0
2
2
α (ψi )
α (ψi )
∂ψ2i

Let us define function F ≡ ψi (
F
i
rem, ∂ψ
= − Fji , where
∂vj
(A.15)

∂mcj
∂ψi

) − α1 κi vj . From the implicit function theo-

1
Fj = − κi < 0
α

and by virtue of the second-order condition,
(A.16)

Fi =

∂2 mcj
∂2 mcj
∂mcj
1
1 2 vj
1
1 vj
κ
κ
+ ψi
−
=
v
+
ψ
− κ2i
> 0
i j
i
∂ψi
α i ψi α
ψi
α ψi
∂ψ2i
∂ψ2i
F

i
It follows that ∂ψ
= − Fji > 0. That is, input quality is an increasing function of
∂vj
output quality for every input.
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Given the assumption that higher input quality demands a higher input price,
it immediately follows that input prices will also be an increasing function of
output quality for all inputs. From equation (A.2):
 

∂mcj
1

Wi (ψi ) = W i + zi ψi = W i + zi κi vj 1
α
∂ψi
In light of the above discussion, each input price facing a particular firm can
be expressed as a function of the firm’s output quality, Wi = gi (vj ). Moreover,
given that output quality is a function of output price, market share, and product dummies, we have Wi = wi (pj  msj  D). The input price function will be, in
general, input-specific, as the indexation by i indicates. When estimating the
production function, we can allow for input-specific input price functions and
the coefficients β and δ will be still identified. However, in this general case, we
are not able to identify the coefficients of each input price function separately,
which is required for computing the firm-specific input prices ŵfjt needed in
the computation of the input allocations ρfjt in Section 3.3. Therefore, we impose the same function Wi = w(pj  msj  D) across all inputs, in which case the
firm-specific input prices reduce to a scalar that we can identify once the parameter vectors β and δ have been estimated. We note, however, that in other
applications that do not require the computation of the ρ’s, it is possible to consistently estimate the parameters of quantity-based production functions using
input-specific input price control functions. Furthermore, even in applications
that require the estimation of firm-specific input prices like ours, it would be
possible to allow for input-specific input price control functions if one had data
on input prices for a subset of inputs. For example, in many data sets, there is
information on firm-specific wages and sometimes there is even information
on firm-specific materials prices. In such cases, one would not need to estimate
input price control functions for labor and materials (since the input prices are
observed in these cases), so that one could allow an input price control function
specific to capital.
APPENDIX B: ESTIMATION PROCEDURE UNDER A SPECIAL CASE:
COBB –DOUGLAS PRODUCTION FUNCTION
We present our estimation procedure under the predominantly used production function specification in applied work: the Cobb–Douglas (CD) production function. While restrictive on the input-substitution patterns and the
output elasticities, it greatly simplifies the estimation routine and the recovery
of the input allocation terms (ρ). In addition, it helps to highlight the fundamental identification forces, as the input price correction term does not include
(interactions of) deflated expenditures.
We follow the structure of the main text (Section 3) and impose the CD
functional form:
(B.1)

f (xfjt ) = βl lfjt + βm mfjt + βk kfjt 
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Following the same steps as in the main text, we get the following estimating
equation for the single-product firms corresponding to equation (10). We omit
the product subscript j given that the firms used in the estimation produce a
single product:
(B.2)

qf t = βl l̃f t + βm m̃f t + βk k̃f t − Γ wf t + ωf t +

ft



where Γ w(·) is a special case of the function B(·) in the main text, Γ = βl +
βm + βk is the returns to scale parameter, and, as before, wf t = x̃f t − xf t ∀x =
{l m k}.
After running the first stage
(B.3)

qf t = φt (x̃f t  zf t ) +

ft



with x̃f t = {l̃f t  m̃f t  k̃f t }, we have an estimate of predicted output (φ̂f t ). It is
then immediate that the input price correction term B(·) enters in equation
(20) in a separate and additive fashion:
(B.4)

ωf t (β δ) = φ̂f t − βl l̃f t − βm m̃f t − βk k̃f t − Γ w(pf t  msf t  D Gf t )

where −Γ w(·) is a special case of the function B(·) in the main text. If one
assumes a vertical differentiation model of demand, then the input price control function w(·) will take only output price as its argument, and the last term
in (B.4) becomes Γ w(pf t ). We form moments on ξf t (β δ) by exploiting the
same law of motion of productivity in equation (18), and the same timing assumptions as in the main text.
In the special case where w(·) is a function of output price only, we can easily demonstrate how the assumption of a common w(·) across inputs helps
identify the coefficients of the single input control function. Suppose that
w(pf t ) = γpf t . In this case, δ = Γ γ = (βl + βm + βk )γ; therefore, once the
parameters of the production function, βl  βm  βk , and δ are estimated, the
coefficient γ is identified. But suppose we had allowed the input price control function to vary by inputs so that wl (pf t ) = γl pf t ; wm (pf t ) = γm pf t ; and
wk (pf t ) = γk pf t . Then, δ = (βl γl + βm γm + βk γk ). Given our timing assumptions, we would still be able to consistently estimate the coefficients of the production function and δ, but we would not be able to separately identify the
coefficients γl , γm , and γk . Hence, in this case, we would not be able to obtain
the firm-specific input prices.
To estimate markups and marginal costs, we need the input allocation
terms ρfjt . In the case of the CD, their derivation is simplified to solving the
system of equations given by
(B.5)

ωf t + Γ ρfjt ŵfjt = φ̂fjt − βl l̃f t − βm m̃f t − βk k̃f t 

where ŵfjt is the input price term that we compute based on theestimated function w(·) and Γ is defined as above. Taking into account that j exp(ρfjt ) = 1,
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this results in a system of Jf t + 1 equations (one for each product j produced
by firm f at time t, plus the summing up constraint for the input allocations)
in Jf t + 1 unknowns (the Jf t input allocations for each firm–year pair and firm
productivity) and we can solve for ρfjt and ωf t .
We now have all we need to compute markups and marginal costs. The
M
main difference from the translog is that θfjt
= βm , so that all the variation in
markups (and marginal costs) comes from the materials expenditure share αfjt .
APPENDIX C: DATA APPENDIX
We use the Prowess data, compiled by the Centre for Monitoring the Indian
Economy (CMIE), that spans the period from 1989 to 2003. In addition to
standard firm-level variables, the data include annual sales and quantity information on firms’ product mix. Although Prowess uses an internal product classification that is based on the Harmonized System (HS) and National Industry
Classification (NIC) schedules, our version of Prowess did not explicitly link
the product names reported by the firms to this classification. We hired two
research assistants, working independently, to map the codes to the product
names reported by firms. The research assistants assigned product codes with
identical NIC codes in 80% of the cases, representing 91% of output. A third
research assistant resolved the differences between the mappings done by the
first two research assistants by again manually checking the classifications.
To estimate the production function, we need firm-level labor, capital, and
materials. Prowess does not have reliable employment information, so we use
the total wage bill (which includes bonuses and contributions to employees’
provident funds) as our measure for labor. Materials are defined as the consumption of commodities by an enterprise in the process of manufacturing
or transformation into product. It includes raw material expenses and consumption of stores and spares. Capital is measured by gross fixed assets, which
includes movable and immovable assets. These variables are deflated by twodigit NIC wholesale price indexes.
We match the firm variables to tariff data. The tariff data are reported at
the six-digit HS level and were compiled by Topalova (2010). We pass the tariff
data through India’s input-output matrix for 1993–1994 to construct input tariffs. We concord the tariffs to India’s NIC schedule developed by Debroy and

input
output
Santhanam (1993). Formally, input tariffs are defined as τit = k aki τkt ,
output
where τkt
is the tariff on industry k at time t, and aki is the share of industry
k in the value of industry i.
APPENDIX D: MARKUPS AND MONOPSONY POWER
If firms have monopsony power, this would alter the first-order conditions in
Section 3.1 (equations (3)–(5)). We briefly discuss under which conditions our
main results, relating markups to tariff changes, are not affected.
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Consider a firm that produces just one product, and suppose production requires just one flexible input Vfvt . The Lagrangian in this case would be


L = Wfvt Vfvt + λf t Qf t − Qf t Vfvt  ωf t 
(D.1)
Taking first-order conditions and allowing for monopsony power gives
(D.2)

∂Wfvt v
∂L
∂Q(·)
v
=
W
+
= 0
ft
v
v Vf t − λf t
∂Vf t
∂Vf t
∂Vfvt

If a firm has no monopsony power,
power,

∂Wfvt
∂Vfvt

∂Wfvt
∂Vfvt

= 0. For firms with monopsony

< 0: the more the firm buys, the lower the price of the input. We

can rearrange the FOC as
(D.3)

W +
v
ft

∂Wfvt
∂V

v
ft

Vfvt = λf t

∂Q(·)

∂Vfvt

The Lagrange multiplier remains: λf t = Pf t /μf t . We get


∂Wfvt v
∂Q(·)
= Pf t
(D.4)
V

μf t Wfvt +
∂Vfvt f t
∂Vfvt
If we now compare a firm with and without monopsony power, ceteris
paribus, the markup for the firm with monopsony power will be larger. This implies that we may be underestimating the markup by ignoring potential monopsony power.
However, even if our estimates of the markup levels were biased due to the
existence of monopsony power, it is still unlikely that our conclusions regarding
the effects of tariffs on markups and costs would be affected. To see this, note
that the above expression can be simplified to58

(D.5)
μf t = θf t α−1
f t /(1 + υf t )
where υ is the elasticity of the input price with respect to the quantity of the
input purchased, υf t =

∂Wfvt Vfvt
∂Vfvt Wfvt

, and the other variables are as defined in the

main text. If there is no monopsony power, then υf t = 0, and the markup expression corresponds to the one we use in the main text of the paper. Taking
logs of the more general markup expression implies that, in our trade regressions (see Section 4.3), we run ln μf t + ln(1 + υf t ) against output and input
tariffs (in multi-product firms, markups and input price elasticities would be
58
Dividing through by W v , and dividing and multiplying the right-hand side by (V v /Q), and
rearranging terms.
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indexed by both firm f and product j). The inclusion of firm–product fixed
effects implies that we will only bias our results if the input price elasticity
changed post-trade reforms. Moreover, we have two empirical pieces of evidence that our results are robust to monopsony power. We might expect that
the firms that are most likely to have monopsony power are larger firms or
firms that are parts of Indian business groups. However, we do not find differential effects of the trade reform across initial firm sizes or if a firm belongs
to a business group.59 This leads us to believe that monopsony power is not a
first-order concern in our setting.
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